The Frog in the Pot: Russia’s Baltic Strategy

According to Ukraine’s intelligence chief, Putin is planning to seize the Baltic states as early as 2027. According to him, “the Russian Federation was supposed to be ready to launch operations in 2030. Now the plans have been adapted and revised so that the deadlines have been shortened to 2027.”

As Putin’s motive, the intelligence chief cited a somewhat undeniably mysterious idea that an empire must “always be moving somewhere in order to expand its influence and territories.” He believes the selection of the Baltics as the target of an attack, in turn, is due to their weakness in the Arctic region compared to the United States and China, which Russia would face in other directions.

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The fact, however, is that all three Baltic states are members of NATO, and as such they enjoy the security guarantees of the world’s most powerful military alliance. According to Article Five, "the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all".

It further states that “each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence… will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.”

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However, Article Five does not define the level of force with which an attack against a member state would be answered. It therefore does not state that an attack on a member state would be met with sufficient force, or with NATO’s full military power, or that tens of thousands of NATO troops would be deployed to the Baltics after an attack.

Let alone that the attacker would be threatened with full-scale nuclear war in such a situation. Instead, Article Five merely states that the response will consist of actions deemed necessary.

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Therefore, the key question from Russia’s perspective—if it wishes to attack the Baltics—is the nature and scale of the actions that NATO countries would deem necessary. And I do not consider it impossible that Russia might—most likely only after the war in Ukraine has ended—want to find out.

This could of course occur through a large-scale offensive or by carrying out—successfully—a blitzkrieg (“special operation,” po-russkii), in which the Baltics would be occupied in a matter of days. Such an approach, however, would involve enormous risks—even the possibility of nuclear war—which Russia would more likely seek to avoid by using the so-called “frog in a pot of water” method and increasing its power in small steps.

The beginning of such actions could already be seen in past hybrid operations exploiting migrants from developing countries, airspace violations, balloon flights, and most recently armed border guards entering Estonian territory. For this reason, especially in Europe, it is necessary to closely monitor whether increasingly serious border violations are directed at the Baltic states in the future. And if they occur, to raise the level of readiness.

In my view, the most sensible course for NATO would be to make it clear that it will use sufficient force in all attacks directed at NATO countries to stop the attacker’s army—i.e., that it would, if necessary, ensure by all available means that the attacker is halted.

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Unfortunately, there are good reasons to doubt that all NATO member states—particularly the strongest one under its current administration, or the states of Westernmost Europe—are willing to make such a commitment. And even if they were, Putin’s Russia might still choose to observe how the “frog” reacts to cautious measures to heat the pot.

For this reason, the Baltic states, other countries bordering Russia, and—next in line to attract the interest of Russian dictators—their western neighbors must themselves ensure that any potential aggression by the Moscow regime is met decisively. And they must ensure that their military capabilities are sufficient for that purpose.

Only by acting in this way can it be made clear to Putin that Russia should not even consider taking the kind of risk that Ukraine’s intelligence chief spoke of.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Why Should Ukraine Trust Donald Trump After Being Let Down by Barack Obama?
Estonia Needs Its Own Air Force
Kremlin’s Provocations Echo Pre-War Rhetoric on Ukraine