The Frog in the Pot: Russia’s Baltic Strategy

According to Ukraine’s intelligence chief, Putin is planning to seize the Baltic states as early as 2027. According to him, “the Russian Federation was supposed to be ready to launch operations in 2030. Now the plans have been adapted and revised so that the deadlines have been shortened to 2027.”

As Putin’s motive, the intelligence chief cited a somewhat undeniably mysterious idea that an empire must “always be moving somewhere in order to expand its influence and territories.” He believes the selection of the Baltics as the target of an attack, in turn, is due to their weakness in the Arctic region compared to the United States and China, which Russia would face in other directions.

* * *

The fact, however, is that all three Baltic states are members of NATO, and as such they enjoy the security guarantees of the world’s most powerful military alliance. According to Article Five, "the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all".

It further states that “each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence… will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.”

* * *

However, Article Five does not define the level of force with which an attack against a member state would be answered. It therefore does not state that an attack on a member state would be met with sufficient force, or with NATO’s full military power, or that tens of thousands of NATO troops would be deployed to the Baltics after an attack.

Let alone that the attacker would be threatened with full-scale nuclear war in such a situation. Instead, Article Five merely states that the response will consist of actions deemed necessary.

* * *

Therefore, the key question from Russia’s perspective—if it wishes to attack the Baltics—is the nature and scale of the actions that NATO countries would deem necessary. And I do not consider it impossible that Russia might—most likely only after the war in Ukraine has ended—want to find out.

This could of course occur through a large-scale offensive or by carrying out—successfully—a blitzkrieg (“special operation,” po-russkii), in which the Baltics would be occupied in a matter of days. Such an approach, however, would involve enormous risks—even the possibility of nuclear war—which Russia would more likely seek to avoid by using the so-called “frog in a pot of water” method and increasing its power in small steps.

The beginning of such actions could already be seen in past hybrid operations exploiting migrants from developing countries, airspace violations, balloon flights, and most recently armed border guards entering Estonian territory. For this reason, especially in Europe, it is necessary to closely monitor whether increasingly serious border violations are directed at the Baltic states in the future. And if they occur, to raise the level of readiness.

In my view, the most sensible course for NATO would be to make it clear that it will use sufficient force in all attacks directed at NATO countries to stop the attacker’s army—i.e., that it would, if necessary, ensure by all available means that the attacker is halted.

* * *

Unfortunately, there are good reasons to doubt that all NATO member states—particularly the strongest one under its current administration, or the states of Westernmost Europe—are willing to make such a commitment. And even if they were, Putin’s Russia might still choose to observe how the “frog” reacts to cautious measures to heat the pot.

For this reason, the Baltic states, other countries bordering Russia, and—next in line to attract the interest of Russian dictators—their western neighbors must themselves ensure that any potential aggression by the Moscow regime is met decisively. And they must ensure that their military capabilities are sufficient for that purpose.

Only by acting in this way can it be made clear to Putin that Russia should not even consider taking the kind of risk that Ukraine’s intelligence chief spoke of.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Why Should Ukraine Trust Donald Trump After Being Let Down by Barack Obama?
Estonia Needs Its Own Air Force
Kremlin’s Provocations Echo Pre-War Rhetoric on Ukraine

Estonia Needs Its Own Air Force

Finland’s Air Force’s operations outside the country’s borders are restricted — in peacetime — by national regulations according to which fighters do not — without a separate decision — fly in other states’ airspace. Now, however, Estonian politician Kalev Stoicescu has asked Finland to change its practices in this respect.

The background is that Estonia itself does not have a proper air force; the defence of its airspace is handled by fighters from other NATO countries stationed at the Ämari base. In the Baltic Sea area in particular, it may happen that Finnish fighters can react to Russian border violations more quickly than those departing from Ämari.

For Finland the problem is that we have a 1,340-kilometre border with Russia. That gives us more than enough to monitor — and, if necessary, to intercept — without expanding the area under surveillance to the south of the Gulf of Finland.

Therefore I am of the opinion that the Estonians would be better advised to consider establishing their own fighter fleet rather than asking the Finns for help. Of course that would be expensive, and the size of Estonia’s economy does not allow for funding a very large fleet, and so would not enable them, in a real crisis, to fend off the Russian Air Force on their own.

On the other hand, an Estonian squadron would not have to operate alone; it would rather complement the support the country already receives from NATO. Through this, Estonia’s defence of its airspace against intruders would also be substantially improved compared with the present.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Finland’s Response to Unauthorized Aircraft Entering Its Airspace
Russia’s Aging MiG Fleet vs. Finland’s Modern Air Power
Finns - Among the World’s Best

Is Cable Cutting a Crime Without Punishment?

Finland detained a vessel named Eagle S, which had dragged its anchor across the seabed and damaged submarine cables in the Baltic Sea. The investigation took some time, after which the evidence was submitted to a Finnish district court, i.e., the lowest judicial instance.

Instead of assessing the criminal liability of the act and delivering a verdict to those found guilty, the district court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to decide in such a criminal case. Therefore, the matter should be dealt with either in the courts of the crew’s home countries or in the courts of the flag state of the Eagle S. In other words, the case would fall under the jurisdiction of the Cook Islands, Georgia, or India.

However, Professor Ulla Tapaninen, a maritime transport expert at Tallinn University of Technology, has noted that “district courts often prefer to move complex cases up to higher judicial levels.” For this reason, she argues it is reasonable that the Eagle S case would be escalated from the district court to the court of appeal, which is one step higher in the judicial hierarchy.

In other words, the Finnish professor at the Estonian university assumes that the legal proceedings will continue in Finland. This raises the question: if that happens, will the court of appeal consider itself competent—contrary to the district court’s conclusion—to convict the crew of the Eagle S?

And if that is the case, who will bear the costs? The Finnish taxpayer, who has already been burdened with bills amounting to hundreds of thousands of euros?

And what would happen after such a farce? Would the case then be transferred to the courts of the Cook Islands, Georgia, or India—or would the legal consequences of the damage caused by the Eagle S to the submarine cables ultimately remain unaddressed?

And furthermore, if that is the case, does it mean that in the future the submarine cables running along the seabed of the Baltic Sea and other seas may be cut at will and without consequences?

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Did Russia Realize the Risk Was Too Great?
Sabotage in the Baltic Sea Sparks Calls for New Maritime Borders
Finland Detains Russia-Linked Ship Suspected of Cable Damage

Finland’s Response to Unauthorized Aircraft Entering Its Airspace

On Monday evening, the airports of the capitals of Norway and Denmark – Oslo and Kopenhagen, respectively – were temporarily closed due to drones being flown nearby. It is clear that the drones were not flown by accident, but deliberately. Therefore, it was not hobbyists, but some actor or actors who wanted to cause disturbances.

Personally, I suspect it was the same party that shortly before had flown its fighter jets into Estonian airspace and its drones into Polish airspace. That is why this incident must be taken very seriously.

* * *

Norway also announced today that Russia has violated its airspace three times during the spring and summer. Two of the aircraft that entered the airspace without authorization were fighter jets, while the third was a small transport or passenger plane, mainly operated by Aeroflot.

According to Norway’s foreign minister, “if Russia deliberately challenges the airspace of multiple countries, this is extremely serious.” This is a view worth sharing, but at the same time it should be noted that even the most temperate cat may scratch if provoked enough – and it would be highly irresponsible if the aforementioned party were to cross NATO countries’ threshold of irritation.  

* * *

Today, information was published in Finland about how the country has prepared for the appearance of unauthorized aircraft crossing the border. Such an event cannot go unnoticed, as Finnish airspace is monitored by radar around the clock, and practically all incoming flying objects near Finland’s borders are detected well in advance.

If there is a risk that a device approaching the border might enter Finnish airspace without permission, Finnish fighter jets are dispatched. As the violations of Estonian airspace have shown, this does not take long. For example, Finnish jets arrived faster than the Italian ones, which took off from Estonia itself.

If Finnish airspace is actually violated, radio contact is first attempted with the intruding aircraft, if possible. If that fails, a fighter jet flies alongside the foreign aircraft to get the pilot’s attention, for example by rocking its wings. In addition, the intruder can be warned by firing flares, which demonstrates readiness to use weapons and makes clear that the fighter is armed.

In peacetime, a manned aircraft is only fired upon if authorization is given by the national leadership. However, this does not need to be awaited if a Finnish fighter itself comes under fire, or if the intruding aircraft uses its weapons against another Finnish target. In such cases, the pilot has the right to destroy the aircraft that has crossed the border at their own discretion.

Unmanned aerial vehicles, however, are always shot down immediately if they cross into Finnish airspace. Therefore, long drone flights from across the border, such as those seen in Poland, are not possible in Finland.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Russia’s Aging MiG Fleet vs. Finland’s Modern Air Power
Responding to Russia’s Challenges Is Essential
Did a Finnish Fighter Jet Rush to Intercept a Russian Sukhoi Yesterday?

Palestine’s Statehood and International Law

Many European states have recognized or are in the process of recognizing the State of Palestine. Finland is not among these countries but is instead waiting to see how the situation develops, together with, among others, the USA, Italy, Germany, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

This is reasonable in the sense that, from the perspective of international law, the existence of a state requires four basic elements – a permanent population, clearly defined borders, a functioning government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Of these conditions, especially the second, third, and fourth are not met, so a rational person would sooner question the logic of the states that have recognized Palestine than that of the states that have chosen to wait.

Therefore, Palestine should be recognized as a state only when – or if – it one day fulfills all four conditions. In the meantime, every country – regardless of its stance on recognizing Palestine – can act in support of a just peace between Jews and Arabs living in the region.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
When Should the Independence of Palestine Be Recognized?
An Unexpected Endorsement of Professor’s Views
Abu Obaida’s Death Brings Palestine One Step Closer to Peace

Russia’s Aging MiG Fleet vs. Finland’s Modern Air Power

According to the Finnish Defence Forces Commander Janne Jaakkola, “three MiG aircraft would not stand a chance against F-35 fighters, JAS Gripens or FA-18s. In that sense, there was no military threat. A rapid kinetic response would have been a mistake.”

The statement referred to MiG-31 fighters that had entered Estonian airspace, and it is understandable insofar as this aircraft type is far from new: production began back in 1979, and the first planes were delivered to the Soviet military as early as 1982. In that respect, it is rather amusing that such aircraft are still part of Putin’s active air force inventory.

* * *

The most recent MiG fighter is known as the MiG-35, which, according to its manufacturer, belongs to the so-called fifth generation of fighters, featuring stealth characteristics designed to make radar detection more difficult. However, the aircraft deployed in the war in Ukraine have—at least according to Western sources—been said to be lacking compared to their American counterparts.

The Russians, however, claim that the MiGs flown in Ukraine are still undergoing testing, so that deficiencies can be identified and corrected before mass production begins. Until then, the bulk of the Mikoyan–Gurevich fighter fleet remains the outdated MiG-31s seen over Estonia—still the fastest fighter aircraft in the world.

* * *

The obsolescence of Russia’s aircraft is naturally good news for Finland, which will soon receive its first F-35 fighters. Even the current Finnish Air Force fleet—the F-18 Hornet—is, according to the Commander, superior to the MiGs in question. That said, the Hornet is roughly from the same era as the MiG-31, its maiden flight having taken place already in 1978.

On the other hand, the MiG-31 and F-18 Hornet have never faced each other in aerial combat, so Jaakkola’s statement about the latter’s superiority is not based on combat experience but most likely only on assessments derived from technical specifications. For that reason, it should be taken with a grain of salt—though I myself believe in the superiority of Western technology over Soviet-era production.

Nor, judging by history, is there reason to doubt that Finnish pilots would be more skilled than their Russian counterparts.

* * *

Finally, it should be noted that the most well-known Russian next-generation stealth fighter is the Sukhoi-57, which has been used—and also shot down—in the war in Ukraine. In 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that a total of 76 such aircraft would be procured for the country’s air force by 2028.

It would be interesting to know whether our Defence Forces’ Commander also regards the newer Sukhoi and MiG-35 fighters as clearly inferior to their Western counterparts—or whether he sees them as being capable of holding their own in combat against American and European aircraft.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Did Russia Realize the Risk Was Too Great?
Did a Finnish Fighter Jet Rush to Intercept a Russian Sukhoi Yesterday?
Finns - Among the World’s Best

Kremlin’s Provocations Echo Pre-War Rhetoric on Ukraine

Vladimir Putin’s Russia once again tested Estonia’s air defense by sending fighter jets flying “dark” – that is, without transponders – toward Tallinn. However, the planes turned back after first Finnish and then Italian fighter jets appeared to meet them.

The details of the encounter have not been made public, so we do not know whether the mere appearance of NATO aircraft was enough to make the Russians retreat, or whether the jets had to make it clear in some way that they were serious—perhaps using some kind of signaling, or even weapons, to drive the message home.

In any case, this was the fourth such incident this year, so it cannot be dismissed as a navigational error. Rather, it was a deliberate action—and therefore a dangerous game that relies on the assumption that airspace violators will not be shot down.

* * *

The situation is, of course, extremely difficult for Estonia and for NATO’s defense as a whole. Previous airspace violations have lasted around a minute, but this time the incursion was stretched to four times that length. And as noted above, the course was set toward Tallinn.

The obvious question is whether NATO has agreed on some kind of threshold after which Russian fighters will be actively intercepted—that is, shot down, as happened recently with drones flying in Polish airspace.

Naturally, the threshold for such an action is very high, since downing aircraft would almost certainly trigger extreme military and political tension. At the same time, it is equally clear that Russian fighter jets flying dark and without permission cannot be allowed over Tallinn; they must be stopped in time, and by any means necessary if required.

* * *

It remains to be seen whether these Russian violations of Estonian airspace will continue and lengthen in the coming days and weeks—and whether they might extend into Finnish airspace as well, testing Finland’s readiness in the same way.

This possibility may be hinted at by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s claim that the Finnish government’s “façade of neutrality has fallen away,” and that a politics of retribution has “literally arisen” in our country. A similar goal also seems to be served by statements from Russia—apparently aimed at undermining Finnish unity—suggesting that Finland’s population is dissatisfied with the government, and that the absence of Russian tourists in eastern Finland has led to “population decline” and economic weakening in Southeast Finland.

According to the American think tank Institute for the Study of War (ISW), these narratives resemble the kind of rhetoric the Putin regime used to justify its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. That is why Finland’s—and NATO’s—communication toward Russia must be firm and unequivocal, making it clear that Russia has nothing to gain beyond its northwestern borders.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
The War in Ukraine Came Close to Me
Did Russia Realize the Risk Was Too Great?
Did a Finnish Fighter Jet Rush to Intercept a Russian Sukhoi Yesterday?

Responding to Russia’s Challenges Is Essential

This morning’s news reported that Poland’s air defense destroyed Russian drones. And this did not happen in Ukraine, but in the airspace of Poland, a NATO member.

Taking into account the recent interference with the aircraft carrying the president of the European Commission, as well as the earlier bombing of a factory in Ukraine owned by Americans and the damaging of EU and UK buildings, it is becoming clear that this is not about accidents but deliberate actions. And such actions can only have one purpose: to test the unity and readiness of Europeans and especially NATO.

At the same time, it is clear that the more loosely the West responds to Russian actions, the more certain it is that Russia will continue to challenge them. The only question is where and in what way.

In this situation, the greatest danger lies with the smallest border states, namely the Baltic countries. Estonia, for instance, has recently been subjected to several airspace violations, the latest just a couple of days ago.

Thus, the question arises: if the West responds weakly or not at all to Russia’s provocations related to the war in Ukraine, could a surprise attack be ahead? For example, a blitzkrieg directed at one of the Baltic states, with the goal of occupying the entire country so quickly that a reluctant NATO would not have time to intervene?

To prevent such a scenario, it is important that Western countries pull themselves together, recognize the obvious facts, and respond forcefully to Russia’s provocations in Ukraine and in its immediate border areas. In doing so, they would send Vladimir Putin the clearest possible message: that there are no easy victories for him in EU and NATO countries—only bitter defeat.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Ukraine’s Missiles and Russia’s Forced Recruitment Set to Topple Putin’s Regime
The War in Ukraine Came Close to Me
Donald Trump’s Meeting With Vladimir Putin: The Advice He Needs

Border Residents Concerned Over NATO’s Article 5 Interpretation

According to a Polish news site, U.S. President Donald Trump intends to make a six-point proposal to Russian leader Vladimir Putin to end the war in Ukraine. Under this plan, the first step would be to agree on a ceasefire, after which Russia would be allowed to keep the territories it has seized from Ukraine for at least the next 49 years.

Once the ceasefire had taken effect, the U.S. government would remove most of the sanctions imposed on Russia and, after some time, once again permit the export of Russian oil and gas. In return for these concessions, Trump is also expected to present demands to Putin.

The first of these would require Russia to accept the further enlargement of NATO beyond its current membership. In addition, military aid to Ukraine would continue.

The claims made by the Polish news site have not been confirmed by other sources, but neither have they been denied. Therefore, for the time being, they should be taken seriously.

* * *

As a citizen of a country bordering Russia, Trump’s plan concerns me, as it would result in Vladimir Putin being rewarded for his aggression against Ukraine. In other words, it would support his policy that any geographical areas once under Russian control should belong forever to Moscow’s sphere of influence.

In Europe, this particularly concerns Finland and the Baltic states, all of which have at some point in their history been part of Russia (or the Soviet Union). In Finland’s case, this was from 1809 to 1917, when my homeland formed an autonomous grand duchy ruled by the Russian tsar.

The fear, then, is that once Russia has recovered from the war in Ukraine, Putin or his successor might decide to see whether the West — and especially the U.S. — would also be willing to accept possible conquests from a future military campaign against a NATO country. That is, for example, the subjugation of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania to Moscow’s power, either partially or entirely.

In this matter, the key question becomes NATO’s commitment to defending the sovereignty of its northeastern members. The central issue here is how to interpret Article 5 of the treaty, which states that "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

What especially concerns me here is the interpretation of the above-emphasized word “necessary.” Does it mean that the amount of assistance is to be calibrated so that the aggressor is certain to be defeated? Or can it also be interpreted — as the Polish news site claims is now happening in Ukraine (which is not a NATO member) — to mean that, as a war drags on, hostilities could be ended in such a way that the conqueror gets to keep the territories it has occupied?

For this reason, I believe it would be good for NATO and its member states — especially the United States — to clarify this interpretation and reassure those of us who live next to Russia that aggression against NATO member states would under no circumstances be allowed to result in rewarding the aggressor — as in the case of the war in Ukraine — but that NATO would, in every case, use sufficient force until the situation between Russia and the victim of its attack had been restored to what it was before the war, and the Muscovite army had returned behind its own borders.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Oily Trap for Putin
A Growing Sino-Russian Threat to the West
AI Drones: Ukraine’s New Edge in the War?

Estonians Have Learned from Their History — and Defend Accordingly

One of the countries that regained its independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union was Estonia—the northernmost and smallest of the Baltic states. It has a population of just under 1.5 million people, of whom 68.5 percent are ethnic Estonians, 21 percent Russians, 5.4 percent Ukrainians, and the rest people of other ethnic backgrounds.

This nation has built a prosperous state, where GDP per capita has risen from $2,685.90 in 1993 to an impressive $31,170. In other words, it has grown more than elevenfold—or by 1,160 percent.

Estonia was independent from 1918 until 1940, when the Soviet Union occupied it along with the other Baltic states, based on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact it had signed with Nazi Germany. Incidentally, Stalin also issued ultimatums to Finland on similar grounds and eventually launched a full-scale military invasion. However, the Finns did not yield and managed to preserve their independence.

Having learned from all this, Estonians have taken national defense seriously since regaining independence. As a sign of this commitment, Estonia joined NATO as quickly as possible, and the country’s defense minister, Hanno Pevkur, has stated that Estonia allocates five percent of its gross domestic product to actual military spending.

Unlike in many other countries, high defense spending enjoys broad public support in Estonia. Among Estonian speakers, 41 percent believe defense spending should be increased to five percent of GDP, and 34 percent support a defense budget of 3.5 percent. Even among Russian speakers, 17 percent favor 3.5 percent, and five percent support increasing it to five percent.

This strong public backing allows Estonia’s defense forces to develop their capabilities further. In practice, this has included the acquisition of HIMARS air defense systems and long-range missiles capable of striking deep into Russian territory. The rationale behind the latter is the principle that if Russia attacks Estonia, the war must be taken immediately to Russian soil.

I believe that Estonia’s perspective is worth listening to not only in neighboring countries that share a border with Russia but also in Central Europe—and even along the Atlantic coast.

This is because people in those countries can only remain secure if the whole of Europe sends a clear signal that Russia has no chance of success—neither in the borderlands nor further west—thanks to overwhelming support available to frontline countries like the Baltics, should it ever be necessary.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Did Russia Realize the Risk Was Too Great?
Did a Finnish Fighter Jet Rush to Intercept a Russian Sukhoi Yesterday?
Shifting U.S. Foreign Policy Sparks Concerns in Estonia

António Guterres, You Won’t Stop Russia – But Mines Might

UN Secretary-General António Guterres made an appeal to countries planning to withdraw from the Ottawa Treaty and reintroduce anti-personnel landmines. Among these countries, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland are neighbors of Russia.

Their departure from the treaty is justified precisely by this geographical fact — and by the fact that Russia is an aggressive and imperialist great power that has invaded the territory of several of its neighbors. There is no doubt that its current regime might also decide to test the security guarantees NATO has given to these countries — once it is done with Ukraine.

That is why it is fair to ask Mr. Guterres how he intends to prevent Russia’s intentions, should it decide to attack, for example, my own homeland. And whether, in such a situation, he would take responsibility for the Finnish lives that would have been saved by effective mining.

I do not expect an answer from the UN Secretary-General, but I remind him that Finland once sought help — in vain — from the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations, before the Winter War that began in 1939. No help came then, and I do not believe Guterres would be able to provide any in the 2020s either, should Russia’s Putin choose to repeat Stalin’s move and order his army to seize Helsinki and strip Finland of its independence.

For this reason, I believe the UN Secretary-General would do well to keep quiet about the affairs of Eastern Europe, and instead focus on achieving a just peace in Ukraine, resolving the conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, and ensuring that Iran does not continue its nuclear weapons program after its war with Israel comes to an end.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Putin's Threat Bolsters European Border States' Defense Against Russia
Highlights of the BRICS Meeting in Kazan, Russia
United Nations, corruption and terrorism

Did Russia Realize the Risk Was Too Great?

A decision point has been reached regarding Russia's "shadow fleet" operating in the Baltic Sea. Estonia recently failed to stop one of the vessels after Russia offered it support from its air force. At the same time, two Portuguese F-16 fighter jets took to the skies from the nearby Ämari Air Base to support the Estonians—and in Finland, at least one F-18 fighter flew faster than the speed of sound for some reason, according to my own observation, although this has not been publicly acknowledged.

Fortunately, the incident did not escalate into an aerial battle, but it still shows that the risk of escalation over the Baltic Sea is very real. Thus, it is only a matter of time before some sort of confrontation occurs between Russia and NATO.

However, Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk has now announced: "A Russian ship from the 'shadow fleet' that is under sanctions carried out suspicious maneuvers near the power cable connecting Poland with Sweden. After a successful intervention by our military, the ship sailed off to one of the Russian ports. The ORP 'Heweliusz' is en route to the site of the incident."

It remains to be seen whether the successful interception of the vessel is a sign that even the Russians may have realized that protecting shadow fleet vessels with air support poses an enormous risk. And therefore, for now at least, they may have decided to refrain from such actions. At least, one can hope so.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Did a Finnish Fighter Jet Rush to Intercept a Russian Sukhoi Yesterday?
Be Ready: Russia May Launch Another "Special Operation"
Sabotage in the Baltic Sea Sparks Calls for New Maritime Borders

Did a Finnish Fighter Jet Rush to Intercept a Russian Sukhoi Yesterday?

Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna has confirmed at the informal meeting of NATO foreign ministers that a Russian military aircraft – apparently a Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jet – violated Estonian airspace over the Gulf of Finland to protect an oil tanker sailing under the Gabonese flag, which was en route to the Russian port of Primorsk. The incursion occurred because Estonia attempted to stop this Russian shadow fleet tanker, as it was unflagged, uninsured, and listed under the UK sanctions regime.

According to Margus Tsahkna, the Russian Federation dispatched its fighter jet to monitor the situation, and it breached Estonian airspace for nearly a minute. “We must understand that the situation is extremely serious,” he emphasized.

The Estonian foreign minister stated that the incident is yet another piece of evidence that Russia poses a serious threat beyond Ukraine. Therefore, in his view, NATO must strengthen its deterrence and defense – especially in European member states.

* * *

This event was particularly interesting to me personally, as I happened to hear a loud bang yesterday while I was in a small house in the Finnish countryside – it sounded as if a cannon had been fired right next to me. I don’t know if that sound was connected to the incident over the Gulf of Finland, but I’m fairly certain it was a Finnish fighter jet flying faster than the speed of sound.

That led me to consider the possibility that the Finnish Air Force might have decided to intervene yesterday – although, as far as I know, this hasn’t been reported anywhere – to ensure that the Russian Su-35 pilot didn’t take any reckless actions. Of course, I don’t know if that’s the case, but the incident underlines the need for the countries around the Baltic Sea to intensify their cooperation in order to put an end to the business Russia is conducting through its shadow fleet.

At the same time, Estonia – at the very least – must invest more in its own defense, particularly in its naval and air capabilities, because Finland would not be able to assist its smaller neighbor if it were also under attack. However, in this case, it would – at least in principle – have been possible, and thus the sound I heard may well have been a sign of Finnish-Estonian military cooperation.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Russia’s War Rages On – And the World Keeps Funding It
Sabotage in the Baltic Sea Sparks Calls for New Maritime Borders
Finns - Among the World’s Best

Putin's Threat Bolsters European Border States' Defense Against Russia

The defense ministers of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have recommended in a joint statement to withdraw from the Ottawa Treaty, which bans anti-personnel mines. The reason cited is the increasing security threat posed by Russia.

Finland is also expected to join this group soon, as discussions have been ongoing about reintroducing anti-personnel mines. According to Jukka Kopra (National Coalition Party), chairman of the Defense Committee, Finland could withdraw from the Ottawa Treaty within the next few months.

This would enable the eastern border states of Russia, from Lapland to the Belarusian border, to defend themselves better against potential Russian aggression. And considering Belarus as a puppet state of Russia, this extends further down to Ukraine’s border.

Finland and Poland, in particular, have strong and well-equipped armies, which are undoubtedly capable of independent defense long enough for other NATO countries to come to their aid. If necessary, they can also help counter an attack against the Baltic states.

Since this text may be read in Putin’s dictatorship, it is important to state that none of the aforementioned NATO countries—let alone NATO as a whole—are planning any military operation on Russian soil. Any claims by Putin’s administration suggesting otherwise, now or in the future, are nothing but attempts to mislead ordinary Russians, much like Stalin’s administration did in 1939–40 when it ordered its army to occupy Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and eastern Poland, as well as launch an unsuccessful invasion to occupy Finland, which resulted in approximately 350,000 casualties for the Red Army in just three months.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Finland Boosts Military Self-Sufficiency and Support for Ukraine
Are We on the Brink of World War III?
Will Finland Withdraw from the Ottawa Treaty?

Shifting U.S. Foreign Policy Sparks Concerns in Estonia

Changes in U.S. foreign policy have raised concerns about the future in Estonia. One indication of this is that former Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces, Martin Herem, has noted that, much like before World War II, "agreements are once again being made over our heads. In Estonia, we are like small change, as the Americans might concede to Russian demands. For instance, Russia could demand that Estonia no longer hold military exercises with more than 5,000 troops."

Additionally, he pointed out the fact that "we are unable to defend ourselves alone, which is why we have needed U.S. support. We have grown accustomed to it. But as U.S. capabilities are currently diminishing, we Europeans must take matters into our own hands."

* * *

Finnish military expert Emil Kastehelmi reinforced Herem’s perspective, noting that the Baltic states would not be able to defend themselves for long without strong external support—especially if Russia decided to exert significant military force in the region.

However, according to Kastehelmi, "small border skirmishes could likely be repelled, as long as they are merely attempts to test NATO’s eastern flank rather than a full-scale war. But if the U.S. truly withdraws from the defense of European nations more broadly, then military capabilities must be found elsewhere in the Baltics. The responsibility for defending the region would increasingly fall on European nations."

* * *

Estonians have also turned their gaze northward to Finland, which is militarily far stronger than Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The local newspaper "Postimees" even published an article discussing the possibility of Estonia and Finland forming a federation, in which defense cooperation would be a key element. The idea itself is not new, as similar discussions took place already over 80 years ago.

However, Postimees’s vision is unlikely to materialize anytime soon, as Estonia’s current military capabilities would contribute little to Finland’s defense. Instead, it would significantly increase the risk of Finland being drawn into a conflict should Russia choose to direct military aggression south of the Gulf of Finland.

Additionally, Finland's standard of living is significantly higher than that of Estonia, which only gained independence from Soviet rule 35 years ago. A federation would likely lead to a costly situation for Estonians as raising prices, while Finnish taxpayers would end up financing economic transfers to the southern part of the union. This would pose practical economic challenges for both nations.

In the longer term, however, such a federation might become feasible if both Estonians and Finns support the idea. After all, Estonia’s standard of living was slightly higher than Finland’s before World War II, and there is no reason why this situation could not be restored—provided that peace prevails. And if the federation could also provide military benefits for Finland.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Europe Needs More Money—and More Will—to Defend Itself
Elections in Georgia and Japan: The Future of Democracy on Different Paths
Estonia is Arming its Military, but Does the Nation Have the Will to Defend Itself?

Europe Needs More Money—and More Will—to Defend Itself

The countries of Western Europe assumed that the collapse of the Soviet Union had made national defense unnecessary. However, the events in Ukraine have clearly shown that this assumption was, at best, naïve—if not outright foolish.

Recently, the issue has been brought back into focus, first by Donald Trump, who has demanded that NATO’s European members allocate as much as five percent of their GDP to defense. Yesterday, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte also weighed in, stating that European NATO countries must significantly increase their defense spending.

Trump and Rutte are, of course, right in their demands, but meeting them is difficult for most Western European nations. According to the annual report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), these targets are particularly challenging for countries whose economies are already struggling.

The least capable of meeting these demands are, naturally, those countries whose economies are not growing at all. Based on GDP figures, these include Moldova, Latvia, Estonia, Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein, Germany, and Austria. Additionally, economic growth has been extremely weak—below one percent—in Hungary, Italy, Finland, France, and the United Kingdom.

The fact remains that Europeans must recognize Russia as a lasting threat to Europe's security, even if it is currently tied up in Ukraine. Therefore, despite economic difficulties, they should find ways to strengthen their defense capabilities.

Many countries have, of course, already acknowledged this, as evidenced by the fact that the combined defense spending of EU nations increased by 30 percent between 2021 and 2024. Unfortunately, the starting level was so low that even a significant percentage increase has not yet led to a substantial improvement in military security. This is why, especially in the EU’s most strategically important large member states—Germany, France, and Italy—as well as in the United Kingdom, defense budgets must be increased rapidly, as both Trump and Rutte have demanded.

* * *

In addition to weapons, a strong will to defend one's country is also essential. In this regard, it was alarming to see that only one in ten Britons aged 18–27 would be willing to risk their life to defend their country in a war—while 41 percent would not be willing to defend it with arms under any circumstances.

This stands in stark contrast to Finland, where 79 percent of people believe that the country must be defended militarily in all situations—even if the outcome appears uncertain.

If the situation in other European countries is similar to that in Britain, politicians must recognize that perhaps their most important task is to change it. Otherwise, Europe will eventually become nothing more than an easy prey for imperialist Russia—and perhaps even China.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Putin, Trump, and the Prospect of Peace
Estonia is Arming its Military, but Does the Nation Have the Will to Defend Itself?
Western Countries Must Stay United Against the Russian Threat

Sabotage in the Baltic Sea Sparks Calls for New Maritime Borders

The Baltic Sea has risen to the center of global politics after acts of sabotage targeted its underwater infrastructure. As a result, Finnish authorities stopped an oil tanker and conducted an inspection, which revealed that the vessel required repairs before it could continue its journey.

The perpetrator of the sabotage is officially unknown, but there is near-unanimous consensus that Russia and Vladimir Putin are behind it. In other words, this is part of Putin's hybrid warfare against Western nations.

It was therefore intriguing when Finnish international politics researcher Risto E. J. Penttilä raised the idea that Finland and Estonia could divide the international waters of the Baltic Sea between themselves. In other words, these countries would agree on a border line such that their boundaries would meet directly, leaving no international waters in between.

The aim would not be to hinder maritime traffic to Russia’s ports at the far end of the Gulf of Finland, but rather to significantly improve the ability to monitor vessels in what would become national waters instead of international waters. This would make it easier to repeatedly catch ships involved in potential sabotage.

It remains to be seen whether Penttilä's proposal will lead to changes, as Russia would almost certainly oppose it. In doing so, Russia would inadvertently confirm its involvement in the sabotage and its intention to continue such actions in the future.

However, Russia is unlikely to refrain from such activities, no matter how much embarrassment they cause. This is because the country lacks a free press and freedom of speech, meaning that its citizens would have no understanding of the fact that Putin’s regime is once again making their nation a subject of ridicule.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Finland Detains Russia-Linked Ship Suspected of Cable Damage
Nordic Nations Unite Against the Growing Threat of Cross-Border Organized Crime
Military confrontation between China and USA highly probable in near future

Elections in Georgia and Japan: The Future of Democracy on Different Paths

In Georgia, it is very likely that the elections were rigged. At the same time, the country's attempts to distance itself from Russia seem to be coming to an end—unless a popular uprising or some other unexpected event occurs in the future.

Another set of elections is also underway, where power may change hands. This time it's Japan, and there is no doubt that the election results can be trusted—not even by the politicians who lose the election.

There are two major differences between Georgia and Japan. First, their political positions are entirely different. Japan has been a stable democracy supported by the United States since the end of World War II. Georgia, on the other hand, has experienced at least a tumultuous path since its liberation from the Soviet Union, colored by Russia's presence.

However, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, for example, also freed themselves from Soviet rule in the early 1990s, and a significant portion of their populations are Russian. In these countries, the native populations—Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians—quickly took control of the state apparatus and shut down Russian attempts to influence.

Even the Russian minorities in these countries no longer wish to be under Russia's control—although they may not fully adapt to the majority ways of life in their own countries either. In any case, all three countries share a strong consensus among their citizens that Russia will not be allowed to interfere in their affairs.

For this reason, it is important to note that all the Baltic states, after gaining their independence, integrated as quickly as possible both economically and militarily with Western nations. Accordingly, they shaped their societies to meet the standards required for such integration.

This has not been the case in Georgia, where a large portion of the population wishes to keep the country within Russia's sphere of influence. Even by conservative estimates, around 40% of the population supports this view. 

As a result, Georgia's future does not seem very promising. At best, the country appears to be on a path that will lead to the loss of its true freedom and its transformation into a Russian vassal state, much like Belarus.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Estonia is Arming its Military, but Does the Nation Have the Will to Defend Itself?
Putin´s Russia got mad about the Finnish chairman of the Parliament
Daniel Freund demanded a ban to Viktor Orbán

Estonia is Arming its Military, but Does the Nation Have the Will to Defend Itself?

The Estonian Defense Forces have begun to significantly develop their naval combat capabilities. One example of this is that the northernmost Baltic country has acquired Blue Spear anti-ship missiles this year, which can also be used against land-based targets. The range of these missiles extends from Estonian territory to areas off the coast of St. Petersburg and as far as the northern parts of Kaliningrad. Additionally, the missile's guidance system cannot be electronically disrupted.

Estonia is also accelerating its weapons, ammunition, and drone production. To facilitate this, it plans to build a defense industry park, which is expected to attract €150 million in investments within just a couple of years.

Estonia already has Korean K9 Thunder howitzers, and more are on the way. Furthermore, it has ordered Caesar howitzers from France and HIMARS rocket systems, which have proven extremely effective in Ukraine.

However, Estonia's navy is very small, and the country also lacks a proper air force. For this reason, the effectiveness of its defense forces depends heavily on the support of other NATO countries in the event of a crisis. In this regard, Finland is likely to play a key role.

Nevertheless, Finnish military historian Martti Turtola has expressed doubts about the Estonians' willingness to defend their country. This was also lacking in 1939 when the country, under pressure from the Soviet Union, signed an agreement that gave the Red Army free access to Estonia.

As a result of this decision, the Soviet Union occupied all of Estonia without resistance in 1940, and after World War II, it remained a part of the "workers' paradise" ruled by Stalin and his successors for five decades. In this sense, one can only hope that Turtola is wrong and that Estonians have learned something from their history. One would hope they would defend their country as resolutely as the Finns did in the Winter War of 1939–1940, thereby preserving their independence and Western way of life.

Aiempia ajatuksia samasta aihepiiristä:
NATO's Northern Europe Headquarters to be Established in Mikkeli, Finland's Former Military Command City
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Will Russia Test NATO's Article Five?

Member of the European Parliament, General Pekka Toveri, has considered the possibility in his latest blog post that Vladimir Putin might test NATO's reaction to an attack limited to one of its smaller member states.

In his writing, he called this possibility the "Narva scenario," where the Russian army would cross a border under some pretext - similar to the Mainila shots that started the Winter War with Finland - for example in the Estonian border, and threaten to use nuclear weapons if the Western military alliance acted according to Article Five to defend its member state.

In such a case, NATO would have two options. According to the first, "Washington, Paris, Berlin, and London would start shaking, thinking they can't go to nuclear war for the sake of one and a half million Estonians. This would be a huge victory for Putin, and the entire NATO would crumble."

The second - and much more likely - option would be that NATO would act according to Article Five and destroy the Russian attacking forces. In this case, Putin's bluff would be exposed - and he would not use a nuclear weapon. 

According to Toveri, "Putin might lose a couple of thousand soldiers, but so what? Over a hundred thousand have already been killed in Ukraine. It would not affect his power. The gains are so great that the risk is worth it."

Toveri's thought experiment is frightening because the Narva scenario puts every Russian-bordering NATO country at risk. Though Finland, due to its strong army, is unlikely to be targeted, the risk is real for the Baltic countries - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Therefore, it would be important for NATO to show the Russian dictator already in Ukraine that it is not to be trifled with. And finally ensure that Ukrainians receive the weapons they need and the right to use them, so that the Russian military is unequivocally defeated in Luhansk, Donetsk, and Crimea.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Ukraine can and will stop Putin
Finland and Western Europe: Effectively at War
The most effective Russian agent in the UK