Lukashenko Plays It Safe as Putin Fails in Ukraine

Belarus is one of the last dictatorships in Europe. The country is ruled by President Aleksandr Lukashenko, whose hold on power is supported by Putin’s Russia.

On the other hand, Lukashenko is trying to avoid getting entangled in Putin’s disastrous war in Ukraine, especially now that it is clear that no quick victory is forthcoming. And apparently for that reason – undoubtedly after carefully considering the matter – he congratulated Ukraine on the country’s 35th Independence Day.

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This act appears, at least according to a Finnish political media, Verkkouutiset, to have been too much for many Russian so-called war bloggers. According to them, Russia’s main problem is not its enemies but its allies – who are unwilling to go along with all of Putin’s stupidities.

Lukashenko has acted in much the same way. In 2022, he understood that it was unwise to throw himself wholeheartedly into Putin’s three-day “special operation.” Whether the reason was a lack of capability, an understanding that Russia’s invasion would not go well, or something else, the failed attempt to seize Kyiv in the very first days of the war showed that this was fortunately the right decision for Belarus.

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The war itself has produced no decisive outcomes since then, either. Of course, both sides have achieved small victories and suffered considerable losses. One such development is just unfolding north of the city of Lyman, where thousands of Russian troops are being encircled.

It is, of course, quite a catastrophe for the Russian army, but on its own it will no more decide the war in Ukraine’s favor than the much more devastating Battle of Raate Road decided the Winter War in Finland’s favor. For dictators like Lukashenko, however, it is a clear sign that they should not sink too deeply into Putin’s pocket, but instead try, as far as possible, to maintain some distance from their most important supporter.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Is This the Start of Putin’s Final Countdown?
Do Belarusians Have the Will and Ability to Preserve Their Independence?
Turning Points in the War in Ukraine: New Threats and Unexpected Allies

2,731 Years to Conquer Ukraine

At least for me, it has been difficult to understand exactly what has happened in the war between Ukraine and Russia during the current year. Of course, it is clear that the Ukrainians have destroyed Russian infrastructure with drone attacks, while the Russians have continued to destroy Ukrainian civilians in Kyiv and other major cities.

What I have seen less information about, however, is how the situation on the front has developed. Yesterday morning, though, I noticed on social media that Volodymyr Zelenskyy had said: “At the moment, the enemy has captured 990 square kilometres since the beginning of the year, while we have regained control of 820 square kilometres. By the end of 2026, however, we will achieve a balance between these areas.”

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It therefore appears that the success of the two fighting armies varies across different parts of the front. In terms of the overall picture, however, the changes are small, if not downright minimal, since Ukraine has a total area of 603,628 km². In other words, the Russians have managed to capture 0.213 percent of the territory of their victim in just under eight months, while the Ukrainians have recaptured 0.177 percent elsewhere.

Thus, the net extent of Russian advances during this period amounts to 0.037 percent of Ukraine’s territory. Or, to put it another way: at this rate, it would take the Russians 2,731 years to take control of the whole of Ukraine—that is, until the year 3757. Admittedly, they would accomplish it “already” in 2495 if Putin’s army managed to prevent Zelenskyy’s forces from recapturing any territory.

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In my view, all of this underscores the absurdity of the war that has been going on in Europe for years. The casualty figures of the armies involved provide equally stark evidence: according to Wikipedia, almost 1.5 million Russians have been killed or wounded, while the corresponding figure for Ukrainians is also close to half a million.

That means that more than one percent of both Russia’s and Ukraine’s populations have been killed or wounded as a result of Putin’s “special military operation.” The former while taking part in a raid on a foreign country, and the latter while defending their homes and families.

This raises the question: how on earth could Vladimir Putin be made to understand the horror of all this, when hardly anyone would dare—even in Russia, at least—to present him with the figures I have set out here? Would it even be enough if Zelenskyy’s prediction, mentioned at the beginning of this piece, that the situation would be balanced out by the end of the year were to come true?

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The situation is not entirely hopeless, however. Perhaps the Ukrainian attacks on Russian infrastructure will eventually lead—through the worsening everyday misery they cause—to a revolution in Russia. And surely it is not impossible that the relatives of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine will eventually have had enough of seeing their sons and other family members sent to their deaths.

Unfortunately, I always remember in this context the view expressed by an older Estonian colleague of mine: Russians will never rise up in rebellion. This is because they are far too accustomed to their poor living conditions, and because they have potato plots to ensure that they have at least the food they need to survive. Thus, according to my colleague, even Putin can count on the support of his people during his senseless military adventure, however long it may last—decades, centuries, or even thousands of years.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Ukraine: Putin's Waterloo, China's Opportunity—and Finland's Headache
Putin's Growing Crisis in Ukraine and an Uncertain Endgame for Russia
Russia's Predicament Awakened the Trolls and Increased the Risk of Nuclear War

Ukraine: Putin's Waterloo, China's Opportunity—and Finland's Headache

Putin's three-day "special military operation" has left Russians in dire straits. For example, motorists can obtain fuel only after waiting in long queues, as Ukrainian strikes on the country's oil refineries have significantly reduced Russia's refining capacity. In addition, the war has exacted a staggering human toll in the form of dead and wounded soldiers—leading to speculation that Putin may even be considering a new round of mobilization.

Yet these may not be the most significant consequences of the "special military operation." According to an article published by the Wall Street Journal, China is seeking to turn Russia into something of a vassal state. This would mean a situation in which Russia becomes dependent on China, more closely integrated with it, and increasingly looks to China as a model and a source of modern thinking.

According to the article, the Chinese have therefore been cultivating contacts with Russians whom they believe could rise to positions of influence after Putin. At the same time, they have been slow to accommodate Putin's wishes and have, for example, demanded that any agreement to build the long-discussed gas pipeline from Siberia to China include provisions allowing them to purchase Russian gas at Russia's much lower domestic prices rather than at international market rates.

When one also considers the halt in Russia's military advance—and, in some areas, even its retreat—Ukraine is increasingly emerging as Putin's Waterloo. And China is unlikely to have any qualms about exploiting the situation to the fullest.

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If, as now seems increasingly possible, Russia ends up becoming a Chinese vassal state as a consequence of its war, Finland should finally begin asking what this would mean for Russia's northwestern neighbor. Would growing Chinese influence increase or reduce the security threat that Moscow poses to Finland?

It is, of course, clear that once peace returns, trade across the eastern border is likely to become easier again. But will it resemble the trade that existed before the "special military operation"? Or will it acquire a distinctly Chinese dimension? And if so, would that be beneficial or detrimental to Finland?

I have not noticed experts, civil servants, or politicians giving these questions the attention they deserve. I therefore urge them to do so without delay, so that we can make the most of the opportunities that may emerge while avoiding the pitfalls that lie ahead.

After all, politics is ultimately the art of the possible, where successful anticipation is already half the battle. This has always been especially true of Finland's policy toward its eastern neighbor.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Putin's Endgame: Deception, Escalation, or Death?
Putin's Growing Crisis in Ukraine and an Uncertain Endgame for Russia
The Taiwan Question: A Conflict That Could Turn Nuclear

Putin's Endgame: Deception, Escalation, or Death?

According to Finnish media, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters yesterday evening that Russia had completely captured the Ukrainian city of Kostiantynivka. Meanwhile, the U.S.-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) disputed the claim, stating that while Russian forces have made tactical gains in Kostiantynivka, "the majority of the Russian presence in the town consists of small infiltration groups scattered among Ukrainian positions."

ISW argued that Peskov's exaggerated statements were intended to shape Western media coverage of the war over the weekend, when the United States is celebrating its 250th anniversary. It therefore remains to be seen whether Russia's so-called "special military operation" has genuinely advanced or whether the claims about capturing Kostiantynivka are simply another example of Kremlin propaganda.

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Columnist Lauri Nurmi, for his part, speculated that Vladimir Putin could ultimately meet the same fate as Nicolae Ceaușescu. In doing so, he echoed a point I made some time ago when I argued that Putin would have no political future if Russia were to return from Ukraine having suffered defeat.

Admittedly, it is difficult to follow developments in the war in Ukraine—as the Kostiantynivka case illustrates—because both sides are accompanied by actors spreading disinformation. This is particularly true on social media, where anyone can publish virtually anything.

In any event, it has long been evident that Putin's three-day "special military operation" has fared no better than Stalin's Red Army's planned "two-week march to Helsinki" in 1939. For that reason, it is possible—perhaps even likely—that Putin will eventually have to announce at least a partial mobilization.

The consequences can only be guessed. What is certain, however, is that if compulsory mobilization is implemented, many more Russian families will lose sons, husbands, and fathers. It is difficult to imagine that those affected would thank their country's leader. At the very least, many of them might privately entertain thoughts similar to those expressed by Nurmi—or by myself.

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This may also help explain why the Russian dictator has reportedly been pressuring his Belarusian counterpart to join the war. Such a move could serve two purposes at once: perhaps fewer Russians would be killed in combat, while Ukraine's military position would become more difficult as the front line expanded.

On the other hand, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka undoubtedly understands that Ukrainians would not simply surrender. They would resist with everything they have, increasing the number of Belarusian families mourning fallen relatives.

That, in turn, would heighten the risk of a coup—or at least serious unrest—in a country where dissatisfaction with his rule has existed for years. For that reason, he is likely to continue accommodating Putin in almost every respect except one: sending Belarusian troops across the southern border into Ukraine.

If Putin ultimately succeeds in forcing Belarus into the war, Europe would face a serious test. Would we merely express outrage, or would we take concrete action? Something more substantial than words and continued deliveries of material assistance to Ukraine?

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Adding to these concerns are speculations that the Russian military could launch a strike against Poland via Belarus or Kaliningrad, disguising it as an "accidental" incident. Such scenarios make the overall situation appear even more serious and Europe's security environment increasingly precarious.

The most troubling question is that we do not know how nuclear-armed Russia would respond if it continued to struggle in conventional warfare. Could it resort to its most powerful weapons if its position in Ukraine deteriorated further and Belarus refused to intervene on its behalf?

And what if Polish forces were to destroy a Russian unit that had crossed the border under the guise of a "mistake"? How would Russia respond? And how would Western leaders react?

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Putin's Growing Crisis in Ukraine and an Uncertain Endgame for Russia
Russia's Predicament Awakened the Trolls and Increased the Risk of Nuclear War
Can Ukraine Create Its Own “Winter War Miracle”?

Putin's Growing Crisis in Ukraine and an Uncertain Endgame for Russia

The European Union has finally awakened to the fact that many Ukrainian men are using its refugee policy as a means of avoiding military service. For this reason, the Commission has proposed—according to the Finnish media—that Ukrainian men of military age should no longer be granted temporary protection in the EU.

One can only hope that the proposal will be processed by the EU's bureaucratic apparatus more quickly than, for example, the proposal to abolish changing the clocks. As a result, Ukraine's manpower shortage could be alleviated at a time when the military situation is otherwise turning so favorable for the Ukrainians that even Russian soldiers reportedly admit they are exhausted and wish to warn Putin of a possible "major catastrophe" ahead.

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The emergence of Russian soldiers speaking out, along with the reactions of Crimeans to Ukrainian successes, suggests that the Moscow government has kept its citizens in an information blackout regarding the problems facing the "special military operation." This brings to mind the year 1940, when Finnish censorship ensured that the public had an overly optimistic view of the situation in the Winter War, and as a result, people experienced the outcome of the war as even more unjust than it actually was.

The same problem now confronts Vladimir Putin and his administration. It is genuinely difficult for them to explain to their subjects why the Ukrainians are capable of destroying Russian infrastructure to such an extent that ordinary people no longer even have fuel for their cars.

If and when a rebellious spirit continues to spread among Russian soldiers, the government will face an acute crisis that will further undermine the operational capabilities of the country's military, and consequently weaken its military performance even beyond its current state.

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All of this could have a truly dramatic impact on the ability of Putin's administration to function. At the moment, it seems to be protected by little more than the absence of a credible opposition—a factor that also makes Russia's future difficult to predict.

Consequently, the final outcome of Putin's special military operation could be anything from a palace coup to complete anarchy and even the disintegration of the Russian state. Of course, the first of these scenarios is the most likely, but then again, hardly anyone at the beginning of 1917 predicted that the Bolsheviks would overthrow and murder the Russian Tsar and his family.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Peace in Ukraine Would Be a Risk to Putin
Russia's Predicament Awakened the Trolls and Increased the Risk of Nuclear War
Russia’s Spring Offensive: Gains Unclear, Losses Undeniable

Russia's Predicament Awakened the Trolls and Increased the Risk of Nuclear War

Russia has found itself increasingly cornered in its three-day special military operation in recent days. Perhaps the most striking example of this is the destruction of oil industry facilities in the Moscow region—caused primarily by Ukrainian drones, but apparently also by Russian air defense systems themselves.

At the same time, the Ukrainians have extended their attacks as far as the Tyumen oil refinery, located some 2,500 kilometers away. Nor does the plight of the Crimean Peninsula, due to the vulnerability of its supply lines, make President Vladimir Putin's position any easier.

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All of this has led to a counteroffensive by Russian trolls on social media. The strikes on Moscow are claimed to be a hoax, there are assertions that Russia is preparing a new offensive in Ukraine, and there are even threats of nuclear war being triggered by the destruction of the oil industry.

In fact, the outbreak of nuclear war as a consequence of Russia's deteriorating fortunes in the war may be a real threat if Vladimir Putin fears that his position could be endangered by a military defeat. From his perspective, defeat could mean being overthrown or even losing his life.

For this reason, it would be important for Western countries—and especially the United States—to state unequivocally that the use of a Russian nuclear weapon would, under any circumstances, cross the threshold for retaliation directed at wherever intelligence indicates Putin happens to be residing at the time. Hopefully, the fear resulting from such a declaration would be sufficient in all circumstances to keep Russian nuclear weapons on their launch platforms.

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At the same time, it should be emphasized to Russia's dictator that he still has the opportunity to make peace. All that would be required is the withdrawal of his forces from Ukraine and the payment of compensation for the destruction caused by his special military operation.

And that Putin still possesses at least a small measure of common sense. On the other hand, it may be—as I wrote above—that Putin no longer has a future if Russia returns from Ukraine defeated. He is undoubtedly aware of the historical precedent of Russia's defeat in the First World War, which led to the murder of Tsar Nicholas II and his family.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Can Ukraine Create Its Own “Winter War Miracle”?
The Ukrainian Lioness Will Defeat Vladimir Putin’s Army
Russia’s Shadow Fleet Exposes Gaps in International Law

The Ukrainian Lioness Will Defeat Vladimir Putin’s Army

Happy Finnish Mother’s Day to all mothers!

People say that mothers fight for their children like lionesses. In the same way, the Ukrainians have acted by stretching Vladimir Putin’s three-day “special military operation” into a war that has now lasted for more than four years.

As a result, the Russian army had to settle for a rather modest Victory Day parade yesterday. Unlike in previous years, there were no missiles on display — nor even the T-34 tank designed in the 1930s, which was still present in 2023. Perhaps the last of those is already on its way to Ukraine as well?

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In one respect, however, Vladimir Putin may well be right. In his speech, he stated that the war “is moving toward its conclusion, but it nevertheless remains a serious matter.”

Unfortunately for Putin, the war has reached its culmination point, and his army’s offensive has stalled much like Hitler’s forces at Stalingrad in 1942. Nor does the future appear any brighter for him, because Ukrainian technical ingenuity is set to reverse the course of the war: new drones and missiles are already pounding Russia’s arms and oil industries, while armed robots have begun supporting — and when necessary even replacing — Ukrainian soldiers on the battlefield.

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Many Russians who have supported Putin up to this point have noticed this as well. But for now, fear of failure has reportedly prevented a coup.

This too is familiar from Hitler’s Germany, where the Austrian corporal remained in power so long that he ultimately chose to end his own life. By then, the Red Army had already reached Berlin, meaning Germany’s defeat in the war had been obvious for quite some time.

Putin’s advantage, of course, is that he ultimately has nuclear missiles at his disposal, and fear of them undoubtedly prevents the Ukrainians from attempting to conquer Russian territory. Thus, he cannot end up in a situation similar to Adolf Hitler’s in 1945 — even though such an outcome would undoubtedly be viewed by many as roughly equally positive for humanity as a whole.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Escalating Threats—and a Touch of Irony
Russia’s Spring Offensive: Gains Unclear, Losses Undeniable
Concern About the Future Is Growing in Russia

Russia’s Spring Offensive: Gains Unclear, Losses Undeniable

Russia’s “three-day special operation” came close to us Finns two days ago, when Ukrainians caused destruction at the port of Koivisto (Primorsk in Russian) on the Karelian Isthmus. Otherwise, however, the war in Ukraine has in recent weeks been overshadowed—even in Finnish media—by the war being fought in Iran.

That is why it was interesting to note that, according to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Russia has intensified its ground assaults over the past week—effectively launching what has already become its traditional spring offensive.

According to him, this is reflected in the number of Russian attacks: over the course of four days, there were as many as 619 attacks across different parts of the front.

Even before these assaults, Russia’s military leadership had increased its heavy equipment and ordered its troops to move to the front line. As a result, tens of thousands of soldiers took part in the attacks.

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However, not everything has gone like clockwork in recent days. According to Ukraine’s military leadership, more than 6,000 Russian soldiers were killed or wounded in just four days—an average of about 1,520 casualties per day.

This means that Russians are now dying faster than they can be recruited. Thus, Ukraine’s military leadership estimates that Russia will not be able to sustain large-scale offensives like those seen now for very long.

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This assessment can be examined, for example, in light of the losses suffered by the Red Army during the Winter War. At that time, over a period of 105 days, Stalin’s army suffered daily losses ranging—depending on the source—between 1,500 and 3,000 casualties. That is to say, on the same level as or higher than those seen in Ukraine during the four days mentioned above.

In other words, Stalin’s brutal regime was able to continue its war for over three months despite horrific losses, even though it only managed to occupy a small part of Finland. In the peace negotiations, however, they gained more, and Finland lost over ten percent of its territory.

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It remains to be seen whether Putin’s dictatorship can send its citizens to their deaths in Ukraine at the same pace as Stalin’s regime did in Finland in 1939–40. At the very least, Putin faces pressure to do so, as Russian authorities have already set expectations for their citizens in domestic messaging.

For example, it was stated in the Russian Duma on March 23 that all wars have casualties, but Russian forces are trying to minimize losses by advancing “at a calm pace” toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. The speed of that pace, however, remains a mystery.

In any case, the reality is that this spring, before advancing “at a calm pace,” Russian forces must first be able to regain control of the areas that Ukraine has retaken in recent weeks—and that will not happen without heavy losses, perhaps not at all.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Concern About the Future Is Growing in Russia
Why Should Ukraine Trust Donald Trump After Being Let Down by Barack Obama?
Ukrainian and Finnish Cases of Desertion

The Frog in the Pot: Russia’s Baltic Strategy

According to Ukraine’s intelligence chief, Putin is planning to seize the Baltic states as early as 2027. According to him, “the Russian Federation was supposed to be ready to launch operations in 2030. Now the plans have been adapted and revised so that the deadlines have been shortened to 2027.”

As Putin’s motive, the intelligence chief cited a somewhat undeniably mysterious idea that an empire must “always be moving somewhere in order to expand its influence and territories.” He believes the selection of the Baltics as the target of an attack, in turn, is due to their weakness in the Arctic region compared to the United States and China, which Russia would face in other directions.

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The fact, however, is that all three Baltic states are members of NATO, and as such they enjoy the security guarantees of the world’s most powerful military alliance. According to Article Five, "the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all".

It further states that “each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence… will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.”

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However, Article Five does not define the level of force with which an attack against a member state would be answered. It therefore does not state that an attack on a member state would be met with sufficient force, or with NATO’s full military power, or that tens of thousands of NATO troops would be deployed to the Baltics after an attack.

Let alone that the attacker would be threatened with full-scale nuclear war in such a situation. Instead, Article Five merely states that the response will consist of actions deemed necessary.

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Therefore, the key question from Russia’s perspective—if it wishes to attack the Baltics—is the nature and scale of the actions that NATO countries would deem necessary. And I do not consider it impossible that Russia might—most likely only after the war in Ukraine has ended—want to find out.

This could of course occur through a large-scale offensive or by carrying out—successfully—a blitzkrieg (“special operation,” po-russkii), in which the Baltics would be occupied in a matter of days. Such an approach, however, would involve enormous risks—even the possibility of nuclear war—which Russia would more likely seek to avoid by using the so-called “frog in a pot of water” method and increasing its power in small steps.

The beginning of such actions could already be seen in past hybrid operations exploiting migrants from developing countries, airspace violations, balloon flights, and most recently armed border guards entering Estonian territory. For this reason, especially in Europe, it is necessary to closely monitor whether increasingly serious border violations are directed at the Baltic states in the future. And if they occur, to raise the level of readiness.

In my view, the most sensible course for NATO would be to make it clear that it will use sufficient force in all attacks directed at NATO countries to stop the attacker’s army—i.e., that it would, if necessary, ensure by all available means that the attacker is halted.

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Unfortunately, there are good reasons to doubt that all NATO member states—particularly the strongest one under its current administration, or the states of Westernmost Europe—are willing to make such a commitment. And even if they were, Putin’s Russia might still choose to observe how the “frog” reacts to cautious measures to heat the pot.

For this reason, the Baltic states, other countries bordering Russia, and—next in line to attract the interest of Russian dictators—their western neighbors must themselves ensure that any potential aggression by the Moscow regime is met decisively. And they must ensure that their military capabilities are sufficient for that purpose.

Only by acting in this way can it be made clear to Putin that Russia should not even consider taking the kind of risk that Ukraine’s intelligence chief spoke of.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Why Should Ukraine Trust Donald Trump After Being Let Down by Barack Obama?
Estonia Needs Its Own Air Force
Kremlin’s Provocations Echo Pre-War Rhetoric on Ukraine

Concern About the Future Is Growing in Russia

Russian President Vladimir Putin held his annual media spectacle, the propagandistic rambling of which was reported with varying emphasis by the Finnish media (Yle, Helsingin Sanomat). This morning, I then came across a post on social media by the Ukrainian Anton Gerashchenko, who is known for sharing his views, and whose content may have been more important than any information conveyed by Finnish news organizations.

According to him, as many as eight percent of the questions submitted for the program concerned Russia’s economic crisis, making it the third most popular topic—previously it had not even made the top ten. People wanted to know when the “bad period” of the economy would end, when price increases would stop, and why the government is raising value-added tax.

Sixteen percent of Russians also wanted to know when their standard of living would improve, and 21 percent were interested in when the war would end. These are likely rather uncomfortable questions for Putin.

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In the same post, Gerashchenko also said that according to a recent opinion poll, 39 percent of Russians believe that the economic situation in their regions will worsen, compared to 33 percent a year ago, 34 percent in 2023, and 29 percent in 2022. The share of Russians who believe that life in Russia will deteriorate next year has also reached its highest level since 2022 (17%).

In other words, the consequences of the war in Ukraine are increasingly beginning to show in Russians’ everyday lives, even though—at least so far—there have been no visible (or at least serious) protests against the war. It remains to be seen at what point ordinary Russians’ concern about their own situation will lead to visible resistance against Putin’s war policy.

Or will it ever?

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Peace in Ukraine Would Be a Risk to Putin
Why Do Russians Tolerate Broken Infrastructure?
Is This the Start of Putin’s Final Countdown?

Why Should Ukraine Trust Donald Trump After Being Let Down by Barack Obama?

The Trump administration has assured that a possible peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia would “fully safeguard Ukraine’s sovereignty.” This is of course a good thing in principle, but it appears in a strange light given that Ukraine’s sovereignty was, in theory, already secured by the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.

In that agreement, Ukraine gave up the Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on its territory, and in return the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom promised not to use or threaten to use economic or military means to coerce Ukraine or alter its borders. France and China later joined them.

As a result of these great powers’ “commitment,” Ukraine interpreted the memorandum as guaranteeing its security and handed over the nuclear weapons in its possession to Russia. This led, in 2014, to Putin deciding to risk Western reactions and annexing Crimea to Russia.

* * *

Putin’s gamble paid off, as the Crimea operation—carried out by Russian soldiers known as “little green men”—did not lead to practically any consequences. This was despite Russia clearly violating the Budapest Memorandum, using as a pretext the obvious falsehood that Ukraine’s government was illegitimate.

At that time, the United States was led by Barack Obama, who did impose some sanctions on Russia but decided not to intervene further in the aggression. In doing so, he ended up convincing Vladimir Putin that no strong U.S. counterreaction should be expected from a military attack, even when he violated existing international agreements that were interpreted as security guarantees.

* * *

The question, then, is what now guarantees that Ukraine will receive sufficient Western support under a new agreement, should Russia at some point decide to continue its military campaign? Would Donald Trump or one of his successors act like Obama did in 2014? In other words, if a new attack occurred, would political condemnations combined with some sanctions and limited military aid again be considered sufficient?

Given all this, I fully understand why Trump’s assurances do not appeal to Zelensky and other Ukrainians. And instead of the agreement he is now proposing, Ukraine demands for its security NATO membership—which Trump’s peace proposal forbids—since it would at the very least significantly increase the risk for Russia that the West might use military force if it embarked on a new offensive.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Is the EU a Real Player in World Politics—or Just a Paper Tiger?
Peace in Ukraine Would Be a Risk to Putin
Why Do Russians Tolerate Broken Infrastructure?

Peace in Ukraine Would Be a Risk to Putin

The meeting between the Presidents of the United States and Ukraine led to some rather interesting perspectives, as Donald Trump called for an end to the war along the current front lines — and Volodymyr Zelenskyy appeared to accept the idea. According to the latter, “we must stop where we are — he is right, the President is right.”

At the same time, Trump announced that he was not ready to provide Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles, which could be used to destroy Russian military and infrastructure targets deep inside the country. Not, at least, before he meets with Vladimir Putin in Hungary.

Before the meeting, Zelenskyy stated that security guarantees are the most important issue for Ukraine. However, Finnish media, the BBC, USA Today, and CBS did not report on what the presidents discussed regarding those guarantees. According to Finland’s President, Alexander Stubb, support for Ukraine remains strong and “includes military and economic assistance, security guarantees, a ceasefire, and a peace process.”

It therefore remains to be seen how Putin will respond in Hungary to a peace initiative that he could, if he wished, present to his people as some kind of victory. Yet compared with his previous statements, such an outcome would clearly be a failure — one that has already resulted in more than a million Russians being killed or disabled.

Thus, peace along the current front lines would be an obvious risk for Putin, since it is impossible to predict in advance which narrative — victory or failure — would ultimately prevail in the minds of Russians. And what might follow from that.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
When Ukraine’s Drones Fly 2,000 km, Putin’s Confidence Shakes
Why Do Russians Tolerate Broken Infrastructure?
Ukraine Got Permission to Strike – But Where is the Target?

When Ukraine’s Drones Fly 2,000 km, Putin’s Confidence Shakes

According to the Kyiv Post, Ukraine has carried out a drone strike more than 2,000 kilometers beyond its border. The target was an oil refinery in Tyumen, Russia, which was reportedly damaged in the attack.

Regardless of the extent of the damage, the incident is significant in that it demonstrates that Russian infrastructure is increasingly within Ukraine’s reach. Consequently, Russia’s war economy is becoming ever more vulnerable — just as Vladimir Putin turns 73.

For example, fuel shortages in many regions of Russia are already severe and are making civilian life difficult. One can only imagine how the situation will unfold in the coming months, with homes left unheated as temperatures drop to –20 or even –30 degrees Celsius.

For this reason, there now appears to be considerable potential in the air for an uprising to ignite. And this seems enough for Putin to be paying very close attention to his own security.

This is underlined by reports that even Vyacheslav Leontyev, the 87-year-old former publisher of Pravda, the leading newspaper of the Soviet Union, is said to have fallen from the window of his fifth-floor apartment in western Moscow. The man is believed to have been well informed about the secret wealth of Russia’s elite — undoubtedly including Putin himself — the existence of which is unlikely to provide much comfort to ordinary Russians facing the coming winter’s cold.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Why Do Russians Tolerate Broken Infrastructure?
Will Trump Finally Stand Up to Vladimir Putin?
Is This the Start of Putin’s Final Countdown?

Why Do Russians Tolerate Broken Infrastructure?

Ukraine has sought to undermine Vladimir Putin’s “special operation” by bringing the war into Russians’ homes, namely by destroying infrastructure. As a result, there are occasional shortages of fuel for cars, and home heating does not always function.

The Ukrainians’ tactic seems sound in itself, but Pekka Toveri (National Coalition Party), former Chief of Intelligence at the Finnish Defence Command and now a Member of the European Parliament, reminded of one problem. According to him, “in a dictatorship, the risk of going out into the streets is great, because if you are not shot, you will spend decades in a prison camp.”

For this reason, Russians can endure the kind of misery that would lead to massive riots in Western countries. The choice is easy, since—as Toveri put it—“the alternative is a bullet in the forehead.”

It remains to be seen what the winter will bring. In the best-case scenario, heating failures and cold homes will eventually lead to a popular uprising and the collapse of Putin’s regime—along with peace for Ukraine. In the worst case, Russians will direct their anger toward Ukraine, and the people will unite more firmly than ever behind Putin’s “special operation.”

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Ukraine Got Permission to Strike – But Where is the Target?
Will Trump Finally Stand Up to Vladimir Putin?
Is This the Start of Putin’s Final Countdown?

Will Trump Finally Stand Up to Vladimir Putin?

Last night, Russia struck with great force against civilians in Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv. It remains to be seen, however, how this will affect U.S. President Donald Trump.

I ask this because President Trump has recently seemed, at long last, to have grown weary of Vladimir Putin and his army’s actions in Ukraine. And now there has been a large-scale attack against Ukrainian civilians – which in itself constitutes a war crime.

For my part, however, I doubt that Trump is still a man capable of putting Putin in his place – that is, of showing Russia to be nothing more than a second-rate vassal state to China. Nor do I think he is the man who could end a war that has already claimed 1,1 million Russian lives, a war which Moscow’s elite continues only to preserve its own grip on power.

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Is This the Start of Putin’s Final Countdown?
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Oily Trap for Putin

Is This the Start of Putin’s Final Countdown?

Vladimir Putin’s three-day “special operation” in Ukraine is becoming ever more visible in Russia. Fresh examples of this include the derailment of two trains in the Leningrad region and a drone strike on the Primorsk (Koivisto) oil terminal, which has left Russian oil exports from this port still suspended.

According to a social media account called The War Action, during the past August Ukraine struck 22 oil- and gas-related facilities, 12 railway infrastructure targets, six defense industry companies, three ports and warehouses, and two airports. As a result, this month ten Russian regions have faced such severe fuel shortages that some independent gas stations shut down entirely—and where operations continue, gasoline prices have risen.

At the same time, the balance of power on the battlefield has shifted. For instance, near Dobropillia, Ukrainian armed forces units have advanced west of Volodymyrivka. Several Russian detachments remain encircled near Kucheriv Yar—and even the reinforcements sent to assist them are themselves facing encirclement.

If these developments continue, it is clear that Vladimir Putin’s position as Russia’s dictator will begin to weaken. His situation is made no easier by the fact that Donald Trump has called on all NATO countries to stop buying oil from Russia, to impose tougher sanctions against it, and to levy 50–100 percent import tariffs on China.

As a carrot, Trump has offered that if all his demands are met, the United States will also be ready to impose major sanctions against Russia—thereby forcing Vladimir Putin to end his special operation, or at least compelling the Russian people to rid themselves of their dictator.

Putin’s difficult situation is also evident from the fact that even Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenko has begun to distance himself from his regime. This was seen, for example, when Belarusian authorities warned the Poles about drones that had recently crossed the border through Belarusian airspace.

Or what do you think, my dear reader? Could all this be a sign that Vladimir Vladimirovich’s countdown has now begun? Or am I just dreaming?

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Ukraine’s Missiles and Russia’s Forced Recruitment Set to Topple Putin’s Regime

Responding to Russia’s Challenges Is Essential

This morning’s news reported that Poland’s air defense destroyed Russian drones. And this did not happen in Ukraine, but in the airspace of Poland, a NATO member.

Taking into account the recent interference with the aircraft carrying the president of the European Commission, as well as the earlier bombing of a factory in Ukraine owned by Americans and the damaging of EU and UK buildings, it is becoming clear that this is not about accidents but deliberate actions. And such actions can only have one purpose: to test the unity and readiness of Europeans and especially NATO.

At the same time, it is clear that the more loosely the West responds to Russian actions, the more certain it is that Russia will continue to challenge them. The only question is where and in what way.

In this situation, the greatest danger lies with the smallest border states, namely the Baltic countries. Estonia, for instance, has recently been subjected to several airspace violations, the latest just a couple of days ago.

Thus, the question arises: if the West responds weakly or not at all to Russia’s provocations related to the war in Ukraine, could a surprise attack be ahead? For example, a blitzkrieg directed at one of the Baltic states, with the goal of occupying the entire country so quickly that a reluctant NATO would not have time to intervene?

To prevent such a scenario, it is important that Western countries pull themselves together, recognize the obvious facts, and respond forcefully to Russia’s provocations in Ukraine and in its immediate border areas. In doing so, they would send Vladimir Putin the clearest possible message: that there are no easy victories for him in EU and NATO countries—only bitter defeat.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Ukraine’s Missiles and Russia’s Forced Recruitment Set to Topple Putin’s Regime
The War in Ukraine Came Close to Me
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Putin on His Knees Before Xi — and Running Out of Money

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs’ senior researcher Jussi Lassila commented on Russian dictator Vladimir Putin’s trip to China, and in doing so, he also summarized his position in world politics remarkably well. He noted that “Putin is on his knees before Xi, which suits China. Xi can present agreements to Russia that greatly benefit China, while Russia is forced to accept deals that are unfavorable to itself.”

At the same time, Lassila reassured ordinary people worried about the growing closeness between China and Russia. He pointed out that “Of course, opposition to the United States remains the common denominator here, but I don’t see any truly unified anti-Western alliance emerging between China and Russia”—and he explained, quite rightly, that “China has benefited enormously from the prevailing global order, which is why its continuity is in its interest.”

Lassila’s comments are both credible and fact-based—and therefore most likely accurate.

Another recent piece of news certainly does nothing to improve Putin’s situation: Russia’s state coffers are beginning to run dry. The liquidity of the National Wealth Fund, calculated in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), has fallen below 155 billion euros. At the central bank, the state has net reserves of 200 billion euros (PPP). In other words, Russia’s assets are sufficient to cover the budget for only about one year—until August 2026.

In that situation, hard facts will catch up with Putin’s so-called “special operation.” After all, you cannot draw something out of nothing, and waging war is not free. It may, therefore, very well be that the fate of Tsar Nicholas II will begin to haunt the dictator who imagines himself omnipotent—sooner or later.

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Russian Oil Giants Suffer, But the Real Reasons Remain Hidden

According to a recent report, the results of all Russia’s major oil companies collapsed in the first half of the year. A year ago, the country’s largest oil producer Rosneft reported half-year earnings of 773 billion rubles, equivalent to 85 billion euros. Now the result was only 245 billion rubles, or 27 billion euros.

Lukoil’s profit fell from last year’s 65 billion euros to 31.5 billion euros. Gazprom Neft’s earnings dropped by more than half to 16.5 billion euros. Tatneft’s and Russneft’s profits declined even more sharply, but the worst result came from Surgutneftegas, whose performance turned into a loss of 50 million euros.

The companies cite as their problems, among other things, oil overproduction resulting from OPEC countries’ policies, the overvaluation of the ruble, and Russia’s high interest rates. However, their financial statements make no mention at all of the drone strikes by Ukrainians against Russia’s oil industry or the sanctions imposed by Western countries.

It remains unclear whether this silence stems from fear of Vladimir Putin, from Russian dishonesty — or perhaps both.

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Ukraine’s Missiles and Russia’s Forced Recruitment Set to Topple Putin’s Regime

According to media reports, Ukrainians have developed a cruise missile, "Flamingo", with a warhead weighing as much as one thousand kilograms and the capability to strike targets up to 3,000 kilometers away. If the information is correct, this weapon could destroy key parts of Russia’s arms industry and/or critical facilities that bring money to the war chest, such as oil refineries.

Reports claim that these missiles are already in production, with one being manufactured per day. That is not enough to work wonders yet, but within a couple of months, according to Ukrainians, they will be able to produce dozens per week.

Ukraine has also had time to test these missiles in practice, though no details about the results have been released. However, it is clear that the most important question in this regard concerns how effectively Russian air defense can defend potential targets—meaning whether it can shoot the missiles down as they travel through Russian airspace toward their objectives.

Still, one can hope that at least some of the missiles will get through and significantly reduce Russia’s ability to replace the weaponry it is constantly losing in Ukraine. In that way, the frontline situation could finally shift clearly in Ukraine’s favor.

* * *

In addition to Ukraine’s new missile, Russia faces another problem: the continuous decline in volunteers willing to go fight in Ukraine.

As a result, Vladimir Putin’s regime has apparently resorted to illegal methods to obtain soldiers to fight on its behalf. One example is 18-year-old Said Murtazaliev, who lived in southern Russia and dreamed of becoming a doctor.

In January 2025, before his final year of high school, he traveled to Moscow to spend a relaxing winter holiday. Instead, Murtazaliev disappeared without his family being able to reach him.

A few days later, however, his mother received a call from the police. During the call, a young woman told her that the boy had been detained in Moscow for some kind of minor fraud.

According to the police, the boy had signed a contract with the army and left to fight in Ukraine. Later, Said told his mother that he had been subjected to brutal torture by police in Moscow, and that he was released only after agreeing to go to Ukraine.

* * *

This and many other similar cases show that Putin’s regime has run out of legal means to get men to die in Ukraine. For this reason, he has intensified the conscription of young men into military service.

To that end, an electronic draft system has been developed. A summons sent through it is valid regardless of whether the conscript has seen it. According to Russian law, however, conscripts may not be sent to fight in Ukraine, since the country is not officially at war there, but only conducting a “special military operation.”

For this reason, many conscripts also fall victim to the same kind of violent coercion in recruitment as that experienced by Said Murtazaliev. To escape it, they are forced to sign a contract agreeing to go to Ukraine.

All in all, it is clear that actions like those described above are gradually leading to growing dissatisfaction with Putin and his regime. It remains to be seen, however, whether this will ultimately lead to an uprising and for Moscow’s current ruler to share the fate of Tsar Nicholas II. In my opinion, that would be more than desirable. 

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
The War in Ukraine Came Close to Me
Oily Trap for Putin
AI Drones: Ukraine’s New Edge in the War?