Russia’s Spring Offensive: Gains Unclear, Losses Undeniable

Russia’s “three-day special operation” came close to us Finns two days ago, when Ukrainians caused destruction at the port of Koivisto (Primorsk in Russian) on the Karelian Isthmus. Otherwise, however, the war in Ukraine has in recent weeks been overshadowed—even in Finnish media—by the war being fought in Iran.

That is why it was interesting to note that, according to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Russia has intensified its ground assaults over the past week—effectively launching what has already become its traditional spring offensive.

According to him, this is reflected in the number of Russian attacks: over the course of four days, there were as many as 619 attacks across different parts of the front.

Even before these assaults, Russia’s military leadership had increased its heavy equipment and ordered its troops to move to the front line. As a result, tens of thousands of soldiers took part in the attacks.

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However, not everything has gone like clockwork in recent days. According to Ukraine’s military leadership, more than 6,000 Russian soldiers were killed or wounded in just four days—an average of about 1,520 casualties per day.

This means that Russians are now dying faster than they can be recruited. Thus, Ukraine’s military leadership estimates that Russia will not be able to sustain large-scale offensives like those seen now for very long.

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This assessment can be examined, for example, in light of the losses suffered by the Red Army during the Winter War. At that time, over a period of 105 days, Stalin’s army suffered daily losses ranging—depending on the source—between 1,500 and 3,000 casualties. That is to say, on the same level as or higher than those seen in Ukraine during the four days mentioned above.

In other words, Stalin’s brutal regime was able to continue its war for over three months despite horrific losses, even though it only managed to occupy a small part of Finland. In the peace negotiations, however, they gained more, and Finland lost over ten percent of its territory.

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It remains to be seen whether Putin’s dictatorship can send its citizens to their deaths in Ukraine at the same pace as Stalin’s regime did in Finland in 1939–40. At the very least, Putin faces pressure to do so, as Russian authorities have already set expectations for their citizens in domestic messaging.

For example, it was stated in the Russian Duma on March 23 that all wars have casualties, but Russian forces are trying to minimize losses by advancing “at a calm pace” toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. The speed of that pace, however, remains a mystery.

In any case, the reality is that this spring, before advancing “at a calm pace,” Russian forces must first be able to regain control of the areas that Ukraine has retaken in recent weeks—and that will not happen without heavy losses, perhaps not at all.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Concern About the Future Is Growing in Russia
Why Should Ukraine Trust Donald Trump After Being Let Down by Barack Obama?
Ukrainian and Finnish Cases of Desertion

Russia to Triple Its Military Presence on Finland’s Border

According to a report by Finnish military intelligence, Russia is set to triple the number of its troops stationed near Finland’s borders after the war in Ukraine ends. It is doing so because Putin’s military prioritizes its northwestern direction – essentially the area near Finland – highly in its strategic considerations.

The military intelligence assessment suggests that the number of Russian troops in the region will increase from around 30,000 combatants to an estimated 80,000 soldiers. At the same time, Russia’s behavior is “likely to become increasingly unpredictable” as Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has severed Russia’s ties with the global economy.

As a result of all this, the border region between Finland and Russia will become “tense.” Naturally, this poses a significant challenge – and risk – to Finnish society as a whole and its independence.

For this reason, it is good that Finland’s Defense Forces have been working to integrate into NATO as quickly as possible, enabling Finland to rely on NATO’s support when necessary and to fully utilize its resources. It would also be beneficial if this were understood in Russia so that they would refrain from any aggression along their northwestern border.

This would also be in Russia’s own interest, as it is clear that its army would face significant challenges in an attack on Finland, especially given the difficulties it has already faced in Ukraine. Finland’s military is far better equipped than Ukraine’s, the size of its reserves is exceptionally high due to compulsory military service, the Finnish people’s will to defend their country is the highest in the world, and all of this is backed by the United States-led world’s strongest military alliance.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
No Low-Hanging Fruits Among Russian Neighbors
Ukraine Plans to Recruit 160,000 Soldiers, but Will It Turn the Tide of the War?
Finnish military intelligence: the Russian army is at the limits of its operational capability

Ukraine Plans to Recruit 160,000 Soldiers, but Will It Turn the Tide of the War?

In Finland, one common question surrounding the war between Ukraine and Russia has been why Ukraine has not declared a general mobilization, despite having too few men on the front lines. However, this perspective is somewhat too Finnish.

This is because mobilization is only useful if the summoned forces have received military training. In Finland, this is not a problem, as men are subject to universal conscription, and women can receive military training if they wish.

In Ukraine, however, there is no universal conscription, so a general mobilization alone would not be of any benefit. Instead, it would be wise for Ukrainians — and it would have been wise long ago — to start training both men and women as soldiers.

Secondly, soldiers need to have proper equipment to be effective. This has apparently not been the case for Ukraine, which is why mobilization has not been timely — nor have Ukrainians been hunters in the same way as Finnish soldiers during the Winter War, who were able to bring their own clothing and other "Model Cajander" supplies and, at least in the case of those in the Civil Guard, their own rifles.

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However, the situation has now changed, as it was yesterday reported that Ukraine intends to expand its army by 160,000 soldiers. The recruitment of new soldiers is planned to take place over the next three months, and if successful, the recruits will apparently be given some form of military training and necessary equipment.

On paper, 160,000 soldiers is a considerable force. For comparison, the wartime strength of the Finnish army is 280,000 combatants, so Ukraine’s additional recruitment could potentially be equivalent to more than half of Finland’s wartime forces.

However, it remains to be seen whether recruitment will succeed. And if it does, what will the fighting capability of these new Ukrainian forces be?

In this regard, the composition of the forces is crucial — in other words, will Ukrainians succeed in recruiting motivated, fit, and healthy individuals, or more or less problematic ones? Secondly, it’s essential to remember that the quality of the training provided will significantly impact the forces' ability to carry out their assigned tasks.

Thirdly, it’s worth noting that even a well-prepared military unit is not fully ready before its first battle. It needs what is known as a successful baptism by fire, during which the soldiers overcome their natural fear and maintain their operational capability in a situation where the danger of death is immediate due to the enemy.

A fourth critical factor is equipping the recruited soldiers. That is, can Ukraine, in its current situation, ensure its forces’ weaponry and supply so that they can operate effectively under the enemy’s constant pressure? My esteemed reader might recall the Ukrainians’ past complaints about shortages of arms supplies.

If — and when — Ukraine successfully navigates all the challenges mentioned above, their decision may indeed lead to a significant shift in the battle situation. This could mean putting the Russian army on the defensive or even driving it into a cycle of defeat.

Of course, this is to be hoped for, but it’s still too early to jump to conclusions. We must wait and see how well Ukraine manages to strengthen its forces.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Western Countries Must Stay United Against the Russian Threat
Bad News for Vladimir Putin and His Imperialistic Dreams
General Pekka Toveri, the Chair of the European Parliament's Delegation for Ukraine