Ukraine: Putin's Waterloo, China's Opportunity—and Finland's Headache

Putin's three-day "special military operation" has left Russians in dire straits. For example, motorists can obtain fuel only after waiting in long queues, as Ukrainian strikes on the country's oil refineries have significantly reduced Russia's refining capacity. In addition, the war has exacted a staggering human toll in the form of dead and wounded soldiers—leading to speculation that Putin may even be considering a new round of mobilization.

Yet these may not be the most significant consequences of the "special military operation." According to an article published by the Wall Street Journal, China is seeking to turn Russia into something of a vassal state. This would mean a situation in which Russia becomes dependent on China, more closely integrated with it, and increasingly looks to China as a model and a source of modern thinking.

According to the article, the Chinese have therefore been cultivating contacts with Russians whom they believe could rise to positions of influence after Putin. At the same time, they have been slow to accommodate Putin's wishes and have, for example, demanded that any agreement to build the long-discussed gas pipeline from Siberia to China include provisions allowing them to purchase Russian gas at Russia's much lower domestic prices rather than at international market rates.

When one also considers the halt in Russia's military advance—and, in some areas, even its retreat—Ukraine is increasingly emerging as Putin's Waterloo. And China is unlikely to have any qualms about exploiting the situation to the fullest.

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If, as now seems increasingly possible, Russia ends up becoming a Chinese vassal state as a consequence of its war, Finland should finally begin asking what this would mean for Russia's northwestern neighbor. Would growing Chinese influence increase or reduce the security threat that Moscow poses to Finland?

It is, of course, clear that once peace returns, trade across the eastern border is likely to become easier again. But will it resemble the trade that existed before the "special military operation"? Or will it acquire a distinctly Chinese dimension? And if so, would that be beneficial or detrimental to Finland?

I have not noticed experts, civil servants, or politicians giving these questions the attention they deserve. I therefore urge them to do so without delay, so that we can make the most of the opportunities that may emerge while avoiding the pitfalls that lie ahead.

After all, politics is ultimately the art of the possible, where successful anticipation is already half the battle. This has always been especially true of Finland's policy toward its eastern neighbor.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Putin's Endgame: Deception, Escalation, or Death?
Putin's Growing Crisis in Ukraine and an Uncertain Endgame for Russia
The Taiwan Question: A Conflict That Could Turn Nuclear

Putin's Endgame: Deception, Escalation, or Death?

According to Finnish media, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters yesterday evening that Russia had completely captured the Ukrainian city of Kostiantynivka. Meanwhile, the U.S.-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) disputed the claim, stating that while Russian forces have made tactical gains in Kostiantynivka, "the majority of the Russian presence in the town consists of small infiltration groups scattered among Ukrainian positions."

ISW argued that Peskov's exaggerated statements were intended to shape Western media coverage of the war over the weekend, when the United States is celebrating its 250th anniversary. It therefore remains to be seen whether Russia's so-called "special military operation" has genuinely advanced or whether the claims about capturing Kostiantynivka are simply another example of Kremlin propaganda.

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Columnist Lauri Nurmi, for his part, speculated that Vladimir Putin could ultimately meet the same fate as Nicolae Ceaușescu. In doing so, he echoed a point I made some time ago when I argued that Putin would have no political future if Russia were to return from Ukraine having suffered defeat.

Admittedly, it is difficult to follow developments in the war in Ukraine—as the Kostiantynivka case illustrates—because both sides are accompanied by actors spreading disinformation. This is particularly true on social media, where anyone can publish virtually anything.

In any event, it has long been evident that Putin's three-day "special military operation" has fared no better than Stalin's Red Army's planned "two-week march to Helsinki" in 1939. For that reason, it is possible—perhaps even likely—that Putin will eventually have to announce at least a partial mobilization.

The consequences can only be guessed. What is certain, however, is that if compulsory mobilization is implemented, many more Russian families will lose sons, husbands, and fathers. It is difficult to imagine that those affected would thank their country's leader. At the very least, many of them might privately entertain thoughts similar to those expressed by Nurmi—or by myself.

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This may also help explain why the Russian dictator has reportedly been pressuring his Belarusian counterpart to join the war. Such a move could serve two purposes at once: perhaps fewer Russians would be killed in combat, while Ukraine's military position would become more difficult as the front line expanded.

On the other hand, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka undoubtedly understands that Ukrainians would not simply surrender. They would resist with everything they have, increasing the number of Belarusian families mourning fallen relatives.

That, in turn, would heighten the risk of a coup—or at least serious unrest—in a country where dissatisfaction with his rule has existed for years. For that reason, he is likely to continue accommodating Putin in almost every respect except one: sending Belarusian troops across the southern border into Ukraine.

If Putin ultimately succeeds in forcing Belarus into the war, Europe would face a serious test. Would we merely express outrage, or would we take concrete action? Something more substantial than words and continued deliveries of material assistance to Ukraine?

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Adding to these concerns are speculations that the Russian military could launch a strike against Poland via Belarus or Kaliningrad, disguising it as an "accidental" incident. Such scenarios make the overall situation appear even more serious and Europe's security environment increasingly precarious.

The most troubling question is that we do not know how nuclear-armed Russia would respond if it continued to struggle in conventional warfare. Could it resort to its most powerful weapons if its position in Ukraine deteriorated further and Belarus refused to intervene on its behalf?

And what if Polish forces were to destroy a Russian unit that had crossed the border under the guise of a "mistake"? How would Russia respond? And how would Western leaders react?

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Putin's Growing Crisis in Ukraine and an Uncertain Endgame for Russia
Russia's Predicament Awakened the Trolls and Increased the Risk of Nuclear War
Can Ukraine Create Its Own “Winter War Miracle”?

Ukraine Plans to Recruit 160,000 Soldiers, but Will It Turn the Tide of the War?

In Finland, one common question surrounding the war between Ukraine and Russia has been why Ukraine has not declared a general mobilization, despite having too few men on the front lines. However, this perspective is somewhat too Finnish.

This is because mobilization is only useful if the summoned forces have received military training. In Finland, this is not a problem, as men are subject to universal conscription, and women can receive military training if they wish.

In Ukraine, however, there is no universal conscription, so a general mobilization alone would not be of any benefit. Instead, it would be wise for Ukrainians — and it would have been wise long ago — to start training both men and women as soldiers.

Secondly, soldiers need to have proper equipment to be effective. This has apparently not been the case for Ukraine, which is why mobilization has not been timely — nor have Ukrainians been hunters in the same way as Finnish soldiers during the Winter War, who were able to bring their own clothing and other "Model Cajander" supplies and, at least in the case of those in the Civil Guard, their own rifles.

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However, the situation has now changed, as it was yesterday reported that Ukraine intends to expand its army by 160,000 soldiers. The recruitment of new soldiers is planned to take place over the next three months, and if successful, the recruits will apparently be given some form of military training and necessary equipment.

On paper, 160,000 soldiers is a considerable force. For comparison, the wartime strength of the Finnish army is 280,000 combatants, so Ukraine’s additional recruitment could potentially be equivalent to more than half of Finland’s wartime forces.

However, it remains to be seen whether recruitment will succeed. And if it does, what will the fighting capability of these new Ukrainian forces be?

In this regard, the composition of the forces is crucial — in other words, will Ukrainians succeed in recruiting motivated, fit, and healthy individuals, or more or less problematic ones? Secondly, it’s essential to remember that the quality of the training provided will significantly impact the forces' ability to carry out their assigned tasks.

Thirdly, it’s worth noting that even a well-prepared military unit is not fully ready before its first battle. It needs what is known as a successful baptism by fire, during which the soldiers overcome their natural fear and maintain their operational capability in a situation where the danger of death is immediate due to the enemy.

A fourth critical factor is equipping the recruited soldiers. That is, can Ukraine, in its current situation, ensure its forces’ weaponry and supply so that they can operate effectively under the enemy’s constant pressure? My esteemed reader might recall the Ukrainians’ past complaints about shortages of arms supplies.

If — and when — Ukraine successfully navigates all the challenges mentioned above, their decision may indeed lead to a significant shift in the battle situation. This could mean putting the Russian army on the defensive or even driving it into a cycle of defeat.

Of course, this is to be hoped for, but it’s still too early to jump to conclusions. We must wait and see how well Ukraine manages to strengthen its forces.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Western Countries Must Stay United Against the Russian Threat
Bad News for Vladimir Putin and His Imperialistic Dreams
General Pekka Toveri, the Chair of the European Parliament's Delegation for Ukraine