Lukashenko Plays It Safe as Putin Fails in Ukraine

Belarus is one of the last dictatorships in Europe. The country is ruled by President Aleksandr Lukashenko, whose hold on power is supported by Putin’s Russia.

On the other hand, Lukashenko is trying to avoid getting entangled in Putin’s disastrous war in Ukraine, especially now that it is clear that no quick victory is forthcoming. And apparently for that reason – undoubtedly after carefully considering the matter – he congratulated Ukraine on the country’s 35th Independence Day.

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This act appears, at least according to a Finnish political media, Verkkouutiset, to have been too much for many Russian so-called war bloggers. According to them, Russia’s main problem is not its enemies but its allies – who are unwilling to go along with all of Putin’s stupidities.

Lukashenko has acted in much the same way. In 2022, he understood that it was unwise to throw himself wholeheartedly into Putin’s three-day “special operation.” Whether the reason was a lack of capability, an understanding that Russia’s invasion would not go well, or something else, the failed attempt to seize Kyiv in the very first days of the war showed that this was fortunately the right decision for Belarus.

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The war itself has produced no decisive outcomes since then, either. Of course, both sides have achieved small victories and suffered considerable losses. One such development is just unfolding north of the city of Lyman, where thousands of Russian troops are being encircled.

It is, of course, quite a catastrophe for the Russian army, but on its own it will no more decide the war in Ukraine’s favor than the much more devastating Battle of Raate Road decided the Winter War in Finland’s favor. For dictators like Lukashenko, however, it is a clear sign that they should not sink too deeply into Putin’s pocket, but instead try, as far as possible, to maintain some distance from their most important supporter.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Is This the Start of Putin’s Final Countdown?
Do Belarusians Have the Will and Ability to Preserve Their Independence?
Turning Points in the War in Ukraine: New Threats and Unexpected Allies

2,731 Years to Conquer Ukraine

At least for me, it has been difficult to understand exactly what has happened in the war between Ukraine and Russia during the current year. Of course, it is clear that the Ukrainians have destroyed Russian infrastructure with drone attacks, while the Russians have continued to destroy Ukrainian civilians in Kyiv and other major cities.

What I have seen less information about, however, is how the situation on the front has developed. Yesterday morning, though, I noticed on social media that Volodymyr Zelenskyy had said: “At the moment, the enemy has captured 990 square kilometres since the beginning of the year, while we have regained control of 820 square kilometres. By the end of 2026, however, we will achieve a balance between these areas.”

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It therefore appears that the success of the two fighting armies varies across different parts of the front. In terms of the overall picture, however, the changes are small, if not downright minimal, since Ukraine has a total area of 603,628 km². In other words, the Russians have managed to capture 0.213 percent of the territory of their victim in just under eight months, while the Ukrainians have recaptured 0.177 percent elsewhere.

Thus, the net extent of Russian advances during this period amounts to 0.037 percent of Ukraine’s territory. Or, to put it another way: at this rate, it would take the Russians 2,731 years to take control of the whole of Ukraine—that is, until the year 3757. Admittedly, they would accomplish it “already” in 2495 if Putin’s army managed to prevent Zelenskyy’s forces from recapturing any territory.

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In my view, all of this underscores the absurdity of the war that has been going on in Europe for years. The casualty figures of the armies involved provide equally stark evidence: according to Wikipedia, almost 1.5 million Russians have been killed or wounded, while the corresponding figure for Ukrainians is also close to half a million.

That means that more than one percent of both Russia’s and Ukraine’s populations have been killed or wounded as a result of Putin’s “special military operation.” The former while taking part in a raid on a foreign country, and the latter while defending their homes and families.

This raises the question: how on earth could Vladimir Putin be made to understand the horror of all this, when hardly anyone would dare—even in Russia, at least—to present him with the figures I have set out here? Would it even be enough if Zelenskyy’s prediction, mentioned at the beginning of this piece, that the situation would be balanced out by the end of the year were to come true?

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The situation is not entirely hopeless, however. Perhaps the Ukrainian attacks on Russian infrastructure will eventually lead—through the worsening everyday misery they cause—to a revolution in Russia. And surely it is not impossible that the relatives of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine will eventually have had enough of seeing their sons and other family members sent to their deaths.

Unfortunately, I always remember in this context the view expressed by an older Estonian colleague of mine: Russians will never rise up in rebellion. This is because they are far too accustomed to their poor living conditions, and because they have potato plots to ensure that they have at least the food they need to survive. Thus, according to my colleague, even Putin can count on the support of his people during his senseless military adventure, however long it may last—decades, centuries, or even thousands of years.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Ukraine: Putin's Waterloo, China's Opportunity—and Finland's Headache
Putin's Growing Crisis in Ukraine and an Uncertain Endgame for Russia
Russia's Predicament Awakened the Trolls and Increased the Risk of Nuclear War

Ukraine: Putin's Waterloo, China's Opportunity—and Finland's Headache

Putin's three-day "special military operation" has left Russians in dire straits. For example, motorists can obtain fuel only after waiting in long queues, as Ukrainian strikes on the country's oil refineries have significantly reduced Russia's refining capacity. In addition, the war has exacted a staggering human toll in the form of dead and wounded soldiers—leading to speculation that Putin may even be considering a new round of mobilization.

Yet these may not be the most significant consequences of the "special military operation." According to an article published by the Wall Street Journal, China is seeking to turn Russia into something of a vassal state. This would mean a situation in which Russia becomes dependent on China, more closely integrated with it, and increasingly looks to China as a model and a source of modern thinking.

According to the article, the Chinese have therefore been cultivating contacts with Russians whom they believe could rise to positions of influence after Putin. At the same time, they have been slow to accommodate Putin's wishes and have, for example, demanded that any agreement to build the long-discussed gas pipeline from Siberia to China include provisions allowing them to purchase Russian gas at Russia's much lower domestic prices rather than at international market rates.

When one also considers the halt in Russia's military advance—and, in some areas, even its retreat—Ukraine is increasingly emerging as Putin's Waterloo. And China is unlikely to have any qualms about exploiting the situation to the fullest.

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If, as now seems increasingly possible, Russia ends up becoming a Chinese vassal state as a consequence of its war, Finland should finally begin asking what this would mean for Russia's northwestern neighbor. Would growing Chinese influence increase or reduce the security threat that Moscow poses to Finland?

It is, of course, clear that once peace returns, trade across the eastern border is likely to become easier again. But will it resemble the trade that existed before the "special military operation"? Or will it acquire a distinctly Chinese dimension? And if so, would that be beneficial or detrimental to Finland?

I have not noticed experts, civil servants, or politicians giving these questions the attention they deserve. I therefore urge them to do so without delay, so that we can make the most of the opportunities that may emerge while avoiding the pitfalls that lie ahead.

After all, politics is ultimately the art of the possible, where successful anticipation is already half the battle. This has always been especially true of Finland's policy toward its eastern neighbor.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Putin's Endgame: Deception, Escalation, or Death?
Putin's Growing Crisis in Ukraine and an Uncertain Endgame for Russia
The Taiwan Question: A Conflict That Could Turn Nuclear

Can Ukraine Create Its Own “Winter War Miracle”?

Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. As we all know, its success has not been what President Vladimir Putin and his generals had hoped for.

Finnish news media MTV3 published a news report according to which the intelligence service GCHQ has estimated that nearly half a million Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine during the past four-plus years, or roughly 50 months. This means that the Russians have lost an average of nearly 9,800 soldiers per month.

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In Finland, the miracle of the Winter War is still remembered. That war lasted about 3.5 months, and therefore it is interesting to compare Russian losses in Ukraine with the casualties suffered by the Red Army during the winter of 1939–40.

According to Russian sources cited by Wikipedia, either 126,875 or 167,976 Red Army soldiers were killed or went missing during that conflict. These figures amount to approximately 36,000 or 48,000 killed or missing per month.

From this, one may conclude that the Finns who resolutely defended themselves during the Winter War were about 3.6 or 4.8 times more effective than present-day Ukrainians in their fight against an invasion directed from Moscow. This is despite the fact that Ukrainians in the current war have killed roughly 2.5 times as many Russian soldiers as they themselves have lost.

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Of course, my text above may be criticized on the grounds that the Winter War was exceptional in rallying almost all Finns unanimously to defend our country. Therefore, it is useful to calculate the same comparison figures for the Continuation War, that is, the years 1941–44.

According to Wikipedia, during those 39 months approximately 63,204 Finnish soldiers and 201,000 Russian soldiers were killed. After doing the calculations, we see that the Finns managed to kill “only” a little over 5,000 Red Army soldiers per month. The explanation is probably the long trench warfare phase associated with that war, during which the fighting consisted mainly of minor skirmishes.

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Therefore, it is also useful to calculate comparison figures for present-day Ukrainians as well as for the Finns of the Winter War and the Continuation War by dividing the scale of their own losses by the number of dead Russian/Red Army soldiers. For this, we first need the figures for their own casualties: according to Wikipedia articles, these were just under 200,000 in Ukraine, about 26,000 in the Winter War, and slightly over 63,000 in the Continuation War.

When we divide the Muscovites’ casualty figures by those of the Ukrainians or Finns, we arrive at the following comparison ratios. In the war in Ukraine, about 2.5 Russians have died for every fallen Ukrainian. In the Winter War, by contrast, about 5–6.5 Red Army soldiers were killed or went missing for every dead Finn, while in the Continuation War the figure was about 3.2.

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From these figures we can see that the Winter War differs fundamentally from the other two wars under discussion. This suggests that the spirit of the Winter War not only encouraged Finnish soldiers to engage in determined resistance, but also significantly increased their effectiveness compared with the less motivated Finnish army of the Continuation War.

Therefore, it is worth asking — assuming that Russians and Ukrainians are, as fighters, roughly equal to begin with — whether the substantially higher casualties suffered by Putin’s army in the current war can be explained by the low motivation level of its soldiers. And is this phenomenon creating a Ukrainian equivalent of the spirit and miracle of the Winter War: a “spirit of the special military operation” and a “miracle of the special military operation”?

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Russia’s Spring Offensive: Gains Unclear, Losses Undeniable
Concern About the Future Is Growing in Russia
The Outbreak of the Continuation War Between Finland and the Soviet Union

The Ukrainian Lioness Will Defeat Vladimir Putin’s Army

Happy Finnish Mother’s Day to all mothers!

People say that mothers fight for their children like lionesses. In the same way, the Ukrainians have acted by stretching Vladimir Putin’s three-day “special military operation” into a war that has now lasted for more than four years.

As a result, the Russian army had to settle for a rather modest Victory Day parade yesterday. Unlike in previous years, there were no missiles on display — nor even the T-34 tank designed in the 1930s, which was still present in 2023. Perhaps the last of those is already on its way to Ukraine as well?

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In one respect, however, Vladimir Putin may well be right. In his speech, he stated that the war “is moving toward its conclusion, but it nevertheless remains a serious matter.”

Unfortunately for Putin, the war has reached its culmination point, and his army’s offensive has stalled much like Hitler’s forces at Stalingrad in 1942. Nor does the future appear any brighter for him, because Ukrainian technical ingenuity is set to reverse the course of the war: new drones and missiles are already pounding Russia’s arms and oil industries, while armed robots have begun supporting — and when necessary even replacing — Ukrainian soldiers on the battlefield.

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Many Russians who have supported Putin up to this point have noticed this as well. But for now, fear of failure has reportedly prevented a coup.

This too is familiar from Hitler’s Germany, where the Austrian corporal remained in power so long that he ultimately chose to end his own life. By then, the Red Army had already reached Berlin, meaning Germany’s defeat in the war had been obvious for quite some time.

Putin’s advantage, of course, is that he ultimately has nuclear missiles at his disposal, and fear of them undoubtedly prevents the Ukrainians from attempting to conquer Russian territory. Thus, he cannot end up in a situation similar to Adolf Hitler’s in 1945 — even though such an outcome would undoubtedly be viewed by many as roughly equally positive for humanity as a whole.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Escalating Threats—and a Touch of Irony
Russia’s Spring Offensive: Gains Unclear, Losses Undeniable
Concern About the Future Is Growing in Russia

A Timely Reminder of the Failures of Europe’s Political Leaders

Next Sunday, we will once again move the clocks forward by one hour. This was reported by Uutissuomalainen, according to which “the proposal to end clock changes is still awaiting consideration by the EU Council. Not all member states have formed their positions.”

The article also stated that “the European Commission wants to promote the abolition of the daylight saving time directive. Commissioner for Sustainable Transport and Tourism Apóstolos Tzitzikostas launched an evaluation in February to examine the EU-wide impacts of clock changes.”

The report is expected to be completed by the end of the year, the Ministry of Transport and Communications said in a press release. After that, the Commission will assess further actions.

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In this respect, it is rather remarkable that this is by no means a new issue. As I myself wrote already six years ago, “perhaps an even more illustrative example of the EU’s inability to make decisions was once again highlighted last night. We still had to move the hands of the clock, even though a majority of EU citizens would like to end it and both the Commission and Parliament have already made decisions on the matter.”

And that is not all, because as much as eleven and a half years ago I could state that “studies have shown that changing the clocks is harmful overall, and therefore the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare has recommended abandoning the practice.” This has not changed over the years, as a scientific review article published last year found that “the transition to daylight saving time was associated with harmful effects ranging from reduced sleep duration and quality to increased sleepiness.”

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Therefore, it is worth repeating once again the fact that this endless clock-changing farce is likely to weaken people’s faith and trust in the European Union—if it has not already made it a laughing stock. And what is worse, year after year it shows ever more clearly that this is not merely about people’s feelings but about harsh reality.

Indeed, the clock-changing farce undeniably demonstrates the shocking incompetence of our continent’s leaders, which is undoubtedly one reason why we have fallen behind the United States both economically and militarily, as the striking chart of GDP development below clearly shows.

Unfortunately, clock changes and economic problems are not the only areas in which European leaders have failed. At the same time, they have also managed to fill many member states with welfare migrants from developing countries—while the birth rate of the native population has dropped dramatically.

European politicians have also succeeded in weakening the continent’s military capability to such an extent that Russia has been able to wage its war in Ukraine for years without the EU being able to intervene. And even worse, they have encouraged the U.S. president to question the usefulness of NATO—developments that could ultimately lead to the loss of Europe’s future and the way of life of its people.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
EU Carbon Sink Policy Lacks Cost-Effectiveness
Is the EU a Real Player in World Politics—or Just a Paper Tiger?
Changing the Clocks Reduces Trust in the European Union

Russia’s Spring Offensive: Gains Unclear, Losses Undeniable

Russia’s “three-day special operation” came close to us Finns two days ago, when Ukrainians caused destruction at the port of Koivisto (Primorsk in Russian) on the Karelian Isthmus. Otherwise, however, the war in Ukraine has in recent weeks been overshadowed—even in Finnish media—by the war being fought in Iran.

That is why it was interesting to note that, according to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Russia has intensified its ground assaults over the past week—effectively launching what has already become its traditional spring offensive.

According to him, this is reflected in the number of Russian attacks: over the course of four days, there were as many as 619 attacks across different parts of the front.

Even before these assaults, Russia’s military leadership had increased its heavy equipment and ordered its troops to move to the front line. As a result, tens of thousands of soldiers took part in the attacks.

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However, not everything has gone like clockwork in recent days. According to Ukraine’s military leadership, more than 6,000 Russian soldiers were killed or wounded in just four days—an average of about 1,520 casualties per day.

This means that Russians are now dying faster than they can be recruited. Thus, Ukraine’s military leadership estimates that Russia will not be able to sustain large-scale offensives like those seen now for very long.

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This assessment can be examined, for example, in light of the losses suffered by the Red Army during the Winter War. At that time, over a period of 105 days, Stalin’s army suffered daily losses ranging—depending on the source—between 1,500 and 3,000 casualties. That is to say, on the same level as or higher than those seen in Ukraine during the four days mentioned above.

In other words, Stalin’s brutal regime was able to continue its war for over three months despite horrific losses, even though it only managed to occupy a small part of Finland. In the peace negotiations, however, they gained more, and Finland lost over ten percent of its territory.

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It remains to be seen whether Putin’s dictatorship can send its citizens to their deaths in Ukraine at the same pace as Stalin’s regime did in Finland in 1939–40. At the very least, Putin faces pressure to do so, as Russian authorities have already set expectations for their citizens in domestic messaging.

For example, it was stated in the Russian Duma on March 23 that all wars have casualties, but Russian forces are trying to minimize losses by advancing “at a calm pace” toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. The speed of that pace, however, remains a mystery.

In any case, the reality is that this spring, before advancing “at a calm pace,” Russian forces must first be able to regain control of the areas that Ukraine has retaken in recent weeks—and that will not happen without heavy losses, perhaps not at all.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Concern About the Future Is Growing in Russia
Why Should Ukraine Trust Donald Trump After Being Let Down by Barack Obama?
Ukrainian and Finnish Cases of Desertion

Russians Turn to Museum Trains

A recent news report revealed that Russia is operating heavily armed armored trains. This is interesting, as I had thought such machines had long since become mere historical anecdotes.

At the beginning of the Finnish Civil War in 1918, the railway network in southern Finland and most of the railway workshops fell into the hands of the Reds. As a result, the revolutionaries began manufacturing armored trains and obtained practical knowledge from the Russians on how to use them.

The military usefulness of trains tied to railways turned out to be less significant than hoped, even though Bolshevik Russia sent skilled armored train operators who provided guidance and advice on their use. Nevertheless, they were not without importance, and the weapon system continued to be developed in Finland up until the Second World War.

Once the war began, however, it became clear that advances in air power had made armored trains highly vulnerable, rendering them practically obsolete by the 1940s. Consequently, as early as 1942, they were converted into anti-aircraft batteries defending key troop and material transports, unloading stations, and railway yards, by equipping them with anti-aircraft guns.

Apparently, this obsolescence has not been recognized in Russia, since armored trains are still in use there. Or perhaps the country’s military believes it controls the airspace so completely that these rail-bound “monster trains” can still operate effectively—at least to secure home lines far from the actual front.

There is, of course, another possibility: that the reappearance of armored trains in the Russian army merely reflects the growing difficulties it faces as losses in men and materiel increase, and as Ukrainians strike infrastructure targets ever deeper behind the front lines.

In this light, the situation of the army carrying out Putin’s “special operation” is not made any easier by the announcement from U.S. President Donald Trump that he will impose sanctions on Russia’s two largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil. Nor is the effectiveness of this measure likely to diminish as Russia’s icy, dark winter approaches—a season when people are more dependent than ever on a functioning energy supply.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Patria TRACKX: Next-Generation Vehicle for Emerging Challenges
Rediscovered Relics: The Story Behind Finland's WWII Weapon Caches
History of Finland XII: Bloody civil war