Can Ukraine Create Its Own “Winter War Miracle”?

Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. As we all know, its success has not been what President Vladimir Putin and his generals had hoped for.

Finnish news media MTV3 published a news report according to which the intelligence service GCHQ has estimated that nearly half a million Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine during the past four-plus years, or roughly 50 months. This means that the Russians have lost an average of nearly 9,800 soldiers per month.

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In Finland, the miracle of the Winter War is still remembered. That war lasted about 3.5 months, and therefore it is interesting to compare Russian losses in Ukraine with the casualties suffered by the Red Army during the winter of 1939–40.

According to Russian sources cited by Wikipedia, either 126,875 or 167,976 Red Army soldiers were killed or went missing during that conflict. These figures amount to approximately 36,000 or 48,000 killed or missing per month.

From this, one may conclude that the Finns who resolutely defended themselves during the Winter War were about 3.6 or 4.8 times more effective than present-day Ukrainians in their fight against an invasion directed from Moscow. This is despite the fact that Ukrainians in the current war have killed roughly 2.5 times as many Russian soldiers as they themselves have lost.

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Of course, my text above may be criticized on the grounds that the Winter War was exceptional in rallying almost all Finns unanimously to defend our country. Therefore, it is useful to calculate the same comparison figures for the Continuation War, that is, the years 1941–44.

According to Wikipedia, during those 39 months approximately 63,204 Finnish soldiers and 201,000 Russian soldiers were killed. After doing the calculations, we see that the Finns managed to kill “only” a little over 5,000 Red Army soldiers per month. The explanation is probably the long trench warfare phase associated with that war, during which the fighting consisted mainly of minor skirmishes.

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Therefore, it is also useful to calculate comparison figures for present-day Ukrainians as well as for the Finns of the Winter War and the Continuation War by dividing the scale of their own losses by the number of dead Russian/Red Army soldiers. For this, we first need the figures for their own casualties: according to Wikipedia articles, these were just under 200,000 in Ukraine, about 26,000 in the Winter War, and slightly over 63,000 in the Continuation War.

When we divide the Muscovites’ casualty figures by those of the Ukrainians or Finns, we arrive at the following comparison ratios. In the war in Ukraine, about 2.5 Russians have died for every fallen Ukrainian. In the Winter War, by contrast, about 5–6.5 Red Army soldiers were killed or went missing for every dead Finn, while in the Continuation War the figure was about 3.2.

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From these figures we can see that the Winter War differs fundamentally from the other two wars under discussion. This suggests that the spirit of the Winter War not only encouraged Finnish soldiers to engage in determined resistance, but also significantly increased their effectiveness compared with the less motivated Finnish army of the Continuation War.

Therefore, it is worth asking — assuming that Russians and Ukrainians are, as fighters, roughly equal to begin with — whether the substantially higher casualties suffered by Putin’s army in the current war can be explained by the low motivation level of its soldiers. And is this phenomenon creating a Ukrainian equivalent of the spirit and miracle of the Winter War: a “spirit of the special military operation” and a “miracle of the special military operation”?

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Russia’s Spring Offensive: Gains Unclear, Losses Undeniable
Concern About the Future Is Growing in Russia
The Outbreak of the Continuation War Between Finland and the Soviet Union

The Ukrainian Lioness Will Defeat Vladimir Putin’s Army

Happy Finnish Mother’s Day to all mothers!

People say that mothers fight for their children like lionesses. In the same way, the Ukrainians have acted by stretching Vladimir Putin’s three-day “special military operation” into a war that has now lasted for more than four years.

As a result, the Russian army had to settle for a rather modest Victory Day parade yesterday. Unlike in previous years, there were no missiles on display — nor even the T-34 tank designed in the 1930s, which was still present in 2023. Perhaps the last of those is already on its way to Ukraine as well?

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In one respect, however, Vladimir Putin may well be right. In his speech, he stated that the war “is moving toward its conclusion, but it nevertheless remains a serious matter.”

Unfortunately for Putin, the war has reached its culmination point, and his army’s offensive has stalled much like Hitler’s forces at Stalingrad in 1942. Nor does the future appear any brighter for him, because Ukrainian technical ingenuity is set to reverse the course of the war: new drones and missiles are already pounding Russia’s arms and oil industries, while armed robots have begun supporting — and when necessary even replacing — Ukrainian soldiers on the battlefield.

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Many Russians who have supported Putin up to this point have noticed this as well. But for now, fear of failure has reportedly prevented a coup.

This too is familiar from Hitler’s Germany, where the Austrian corporal remained in power so long that he ultimately chose to end his own life. By then, the Red Army had already reached Berlin, meaning Germany’s defeat in the war had been obvious for quite some time.

Putin’s advantage, of course, is that he ultimately has nuclear missiles at his disposal, and fear of them undoubtedly prevents the Ukrainians from attempting to conquer Russian territory. Thus, he cannot end up in a situation similar to Adolf Hitler’s in 1945 — even though such an outcome would undoubtedly be viewed by many as roughly equally positive for humanity as a whole.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Escalating Threats—and a Touch of Irony
Russia’s Spring Offensive: Gains Unclear, Losses Undeniable
Concern About the Future Is Growing in Russia

Russians Turn to Museum Trains

A recent news report revealed that Russia is operating heavily armed armored trains. This is interesting, as I had thought such machines had long since become mere historical anecdotes.

At the beginning of the Finnish Civil War in 1918, the railway network in southern Finland and most of the railway workshops fell into the hands of the Reds. As a result, the revolutionaries began manufacturing armored trains and obtained practical knowledge from the Russians on how to use them.

The military usefulness of trains tied to railways turned out to be less significant than hoped, even though Bolshevik Russia sent skilled armored train operators who provided guidance and advice on their use. Nevertheless, they were not without importance, and the weapon system continued to be developed in Finland up until the Second World War.

Once the war began, however, it became clear that advances in air power had made armored trains highly vulnerable, rendering them practically obsolete by the 1940s. Consequently, as early as 1942, they were converted into anti-aircraft batteries defending key troop and material transports, unloading stations, and railway yards, by equipping them with anti-aircraft guns.

Apparently, this obsolescence has not been recognized in Russia, since armored trains are still in use there. Or perhaps the country’s military believes it controls the airspace so completely that these rail-bound “monster trains” can still operate effectively—at least to secure home lines far from the actual front.

There is, of course, another possibility: that the reappearance of armored trains in the Russian army merely reflects the growing difficulties it faces as losses in men and materiel increase, and as Ukrainians strike infrastructure targets ever deeper behind the front lines.

In this light, the situation of the army carrying out Putin’s “special operation” is not made any easier by the announcement from U.S. President Donald Trump that he will impose sanctions on Russia’s two largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil. Nor is the effectiveness of this measure likely to diminish as Russia’s icy, dark winter approaches—a season when people are more dependent than ever on a functioning energy supply.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Patria TRACKX: Next-Generation Vehicle for Emerging Challenges
Rediscovered Relics: The Story Behind Finland's WWII Weapon Caches
History of Finland XII: Bloody civil war