Military Superiority Does Not Guarantee Victory

Nobody cares if a dog bites a man. Consequently, such incidents are not reported in the news, and they certainly do not make headline stories.

It is a different matter if a man bites a dog. That is unexpected and therefore the kind of event that makes headlines.

* * *

This came to mind when virtually all major Finnish media outlets (example, another) reported that Iran's armed forces had succeeded in killing two and wounding four American soldiers. The last time Iran managed to kill an enemy combatant was last March, and over the course of the current war it has reportedly killed a total of fifteen American soldiers.

According to Wikipedia, the Iranians have meanwhile lost 1,221 soldiers. That means the cost of one American soldier amounts to roughly 81 Iranian soldiers. In other words, one American is worth more than eighty Persian Muslims.

This figure can be compared, for example, with the Winter War, during which about five Red Army soldiers were killed or wounded for every Finnish soldier lost. This suggests that the Americans have been about sixteen times more militarily effective against the Iranians this year than the Finns were against the Soviets during the Winter War.

* * *

The essential question, however, is this: if the Finns' fivefold superiority was enough to halt the Red Army's offensive, will the Americans' superiority—sixteen times greater than that achieved by the Finns in the Winter War, amounting to an overall advantage of more than eighty to one—be sufficient to defeat the Iranians?

At the moment, it does not appear so, although the Americans have naturally launched retaliatory strikes in response to these events.

Such strikes, however, do not win wars, nor do they apparently succeed in toppling governments. That would require the deployment of ground forces, which would also mean a substantial increase in American military casualties.

Even President Donald Trump is unlikely to be willing to take that step, as he too remembers the war in Afghanistan, in which 2,328 U.S. soldiers lost their lives. That conflict ended, under pressure from the home front, in the defeat of the Americans—and the Europeans who had supported them.

* * *

Based on the above, it is likely that Trump's war against the Iranians will end in a humiliating defeat for the United States. The greatest victims will be ordinary Iranians, who had hoped to see their government—one guided by medieval values—overthrown. And, of course, people around the world will also suffer if the Strait of Hormuz effectively becomes a trade route controlled by Iran, with transit requiring the payment of tariffs or tolls.

Another significant consequence is that Iranian resistance has demonstrated that American military power may be less formidable than previously believed. This is something that has undoubtedly been noticed in Beijing, which has its own strategic interests in East Asia. For that reason, Taiwan in particular—but Japan as well—has good reason to prepare for the growing assertiveness of Chinese imperial ambitions.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Who Really Rules Iran?
Trump’s War Without Strategy: Why Iran May Come Out Stronger
Escalating Threats—and a Touch of Irony

Ukraine: Putin's Waterloo, China's Opportunity—and Finland's Headache

Putin's three-day "special military operation" has left Russians in dire straits. For example, motorists can obtain fuel only after waiting in long queues, as Ukrainian strikes on the country's oil refineries have significantly reduced Russia's refining capacity. In addition, the war has exacted a staggering human toll in the form of dead and wounded soldiers—leading to speculation that Putin may even be considering a new round of mobilization.

Yet these may not be the most significant consequences of the "special military operation." According to an article published by the Wall Street Journal, China is seeking to turn Russia into something of a vassal state. This would mean a situation in which Russia becomes dependent on China, more closely integrated with it, and increasingly looks to China as a model and a source of modern thinking.

According to the article, the Chinese have therefore been cultivating contacts with Russians whom they believe could rise to positions of influence after Putin. At the same time, they have been slow to accommodate Putin's wishes and have, for example, demanded that any agreement to build the long-discussed gas pipeline from Siberia to China include provisions allowing them to purchase Russian gas at Russia's much lower domestic prices rather than at international market rates.

When one also considers the halt in Russia's military advance—and, in some areas, even its retreat—Ukraine is increasingly emerging as Putin's Waterloo. And China is unlikely to have any qualms about exploiting the situation to the fullest.

* * *

If, as now seems increasingly possible, Russia ends up becoming a Chinese vassal state as a consequence of its war, Finland should finally begin asking what this would mean for Russia's northwestern neighbor. Would growing Chinese influence increase or reduce the security threat that Moscow poses to Finland?

It is, of course, clear that once peace returns, trade across the eastern border is likely to become easier again. But will it resemble the trade that existed before the "special military operation"? Or will it acquire a distinctly Chinese dimension? And if so, would that be beneficial or detrimental to Finland?

I have not noticed experts, civil servants, or politicians giving these questions the attention they deserve. I therefore urge them to do so without delay, so that we can make the most of the opportunities that may emerge while avoiding the pitfalls that lie ahead.

After all, politics is ultimately the art of the possible, where successful anticipation is already half the battle. This has always been especially true of Finland's policy toward its eastern neighbor.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Putin's Endgame: Deception, Escalation, or Death?
Putin's Growing Crisis in Ukraine and an Uncertain Endgame for Russia
The Taiwan Question: A Conflict That Could Turn Nuclear

The Early Effects of Finland's Tightened Immigration Policy

Finnish immigration policy has led to an increase in sexual and violent crime. A recent example is 29-year-old Munir Suleyman Weyrah, whose sentence was reduced by the Court of Appeal to two years and ten months in prison after the District Court's ruling.

In addition, he was ordered to pay his victim €8,800 in compensation for emotional suffering. The amount is laughable considering that, after the assault, the victim has no longer been able to live in her own home.

Of course, the rape committed by Munir was only one case among many similar ones. Nor do I believe it will change the views of those Finns who have supported previous immigration policies any more than the large number of similar incidents that came before it.

As a result, Munir will undoubtedly have many who follow his example. And Finnish women will continue to "enjoy" forced sexual acts and the small compensation payments that follow from them.

* * *

This will happen despite the fact that Finland's current government has made many changes to immigration-related legislation. Moreover, previous mistakes in immigration policy have also been acknowledged in many other EU countries.

Unfortunately, those decisions are not yet reflected in the asylum statistics. During the past twelve months, the largest groups receiving positive asylum decisions have been 380 Somalis, 301 Afghans, and 140 Iraqis. These figures can be compared with the corresponding statistics from 2023, when the Orpo government took office: asylum was granted to 258 Afghans, 246 Somalis, and 174 Iraqis.

One positive development is that while Finland deported 120 Iraqis, 29 Somalis, and no Afghans in 2023, over the past 12 months deportation decisions have been issued for 214 Iraqis, 40 Somalis, and 26 Afghans. Admittedly, the numbers of deported Somalis and Afghans remain well below the numbers granted asylum, but in the case of Iraqis, the trend has reversed.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Sensible Immigration or Moral Posturing?
Swedish Ministers Condemn Antisemitic Protest Outside Jewish School
Attempted Homicides in Finland Reach Highest Level of the 2000s

Who Really Rules Iran?

The Finnish Broadcasting company Yle has closely followed the funeral of Iran’s dictator, Ali Khamenei. At the same time, it has reported that the new Ayatollah, Mojtaba Khamenei, did not appear at the funeral and has not been seen in public even once.

Messages purportedly issued by Khamenei have, however, been read out in Iran before. In addition, the United States and Israel are said to possess intelligence suggesting that Mojtaba is still alive.

That may, of course, be true—or it may not. What is clear, however, is that a head of state hiding like a rat cannot truly be the one exercising power—not even in Iran. If he remains in hiding, someone else must be wielding authority in his place: someone who does not want their own name mentioned publicly and instead issues orders in Mojtaba’s name.

If, on the other hand, Mojtaba has in fact died, it would be entirely understandable that the real holder of power would not want their own name splashed across the headlines. It would instead be far more advantageous for them to claim that Mojtaba is alive and governing the country from a secret bunker, much like Adolf Hitler was said to be doing in 1945.

* * *

I readily admit that what I have written above contains elements of a conspiracy theory. Time will tell whether Mojtaba returns as Iran’s visible religious leader and head of state once peace finally returns.

For my part, to borrow the late ski jumper Matti Nykänen’s famous expression, I would put the odds at no better than “fifty-sixty.”

Before that, it remains to be seen whether Donald Trump can ultimately disengage from Iran without being seen as having suffered a humiliating defeat.

At the moment, however, it appears that Iran has no intention of giving up either its enriched uranium or its Islamist system of government. Even restoring freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz seems unlikely.

* * *

Since I began with a conspiracy theory, it is perhaps only fitting to end with a dose of hindsight.

Trump and the United States would not be in their current predicament if the U.S. military had continued its extraordinarily successful offensive against Iran in the summer of 2025.

Trump, however, chose not to let it do so. Instead, he halted the offensive, giving Iran time to recover and learn from the experience—which it did. The result was a significant improvement in Iran’s military capabilities and the stalemate now taking shape, in which the Americans can hope, at best, to restore the situation that existed before the offensive began—and perhaps not even that.

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Trump’s War Without Strategy: Why Iran May Come Out Stronger
Escalating Threats—and a Touch of Irony
Finnish Ex-Military Chief: U.S. Likely Halted Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program

Putin's Endgame: Deception, Escalation, or Death?

According to Finnish media, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters yesterday evening that Russia had completely captured the Ukrainian city of Kostiantynivka. Meanwhile, the U.S.-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) disputed the claim, stating that while Russian forces have made tactical gains in Kostiantynivka, "the majority of the Russian presence in the town consists of small infiltration groups scattered among Ukrainian positions."

ISW argued that Peskov's exaggerated statements were intended to shape Western media coverage of the war over the weekend, when the United States is celebrating its 250th anniversary. It therefore remains to be seen whether Russia's so-called "special military operation" has genuinely advanced or whether the claims about capturing Kostiantynivka are simply another example of Kremlin propaganda.

* * *

Columnist Lauri Nurmi, for his part, speculated that Vladimir Putin could ultimately meet the same fate as Nicolae Ceaușescu. In doing so, he echoed a point I made some time ago when I argued that Putin would have no political future if Russia were to return from Ukraine having suffered defeat.

Admittedly, it is difficult to follow developments in the war in Ukraine—as the Kostiantynivka case illustrates—because both sides are accompanied by actors spreading disinformation. This is particularly true on social media, where anyone can publish virtually anything.

In any event, it has long been evident that Putin's three-day "special military operation" has fared no better than Stalin's Red Army's planned "two-week march to Helsinki" in 1939. For that reason, it is possible—perhaps even likely—that Putin will eventually have to announce at least a partial mobilization.

The consequences can only be guessed. What is certain, however, is that if compulsory mobilization is implemented, many more Russian families will lose sons, husbands, and fathers. It is difficult to imagine that those affected would thank their country's leader. At the very least, many of them might privately entertain thoughts similar to those expressed by Nurmi—or by myself.

* * *

This may also help explain why the Russian dictator has reportedly been pressuring his Belarusian counterpart to join the war. Such a move could serve two purposes at once: perhaps fewer Russians would be killed in combat, while Ukraine's military position would become more difficult as the front line expanded.

On the other hand, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka undoubtedly understands that Ukrainians would not simply surrender. They would resist with everything they have, increasing the number of Belarusian families mourning fallen relatives.

That, in turn, would heighten the risk of a coup—or at least serious unrest—in a country where dissatisfaction with his rule has existed for years. For that reason, he is likely to continue accommodating Putin in almost every respect except one: sending Belarusian troops across the southern border into Ukraine.

If Putin ultimately succeeds in forcing Belarus into the war, Europe would face a serious test. Would we merely express outrage, or would we take concrete action? Something more substantial than words and continued deliveries of material assistance to Ukraine?

* * *

Adding to these concerns are speculations that the Russian military could launch a strike against Poland via Belarus or Kaliningrad, disguising it as an "accidental" incident. Such scenarios make the overall situation appear even more serious and Europe's security environment increasingly precarious.

The most troubling question is that we do not know how nuclear-armed Russia would respond if it continued to struggle in conventional warfare. Could it resort to its most powerful weapons if its position in Ukraine deteriorated further and Belarus refused to intervene on its behalf?

And what if Polish forces were to destroy a Russian unit that had crossed the border under the guise of a "mistake"? How would Russia respond? And how would Western leaders react?

Previous thoughts on the same topic:
Putin's Growing Crisis in Ukraine and an Uncertain Endgame for Russia
Russia's Predicament Awakened the Trolls and Increased the Risk of Nuclear War
Can Ukraine Create Its Own “Winter War Miracle”?